> I never said he was enacting official CS policy

I didn’t intend to convey that you had. My meaning was that Polk acted on his own.

> So from Polk’s written perspective the move to Columbus was not only a counter to the threat to it from the Federals but indeed a tit for tat for Camp Dick Robinson as well as other clear violations of KY by the Federals.
> What I meant by the friendship between Polk and Davis was I think that Polk felt that by disobeying stated political policy, Davis would have his back because of that friendship. It took a few days for Davis to come out and say anything on this after Walker ordered him out and Magoffin asked him to leave. Even Isham Harris was horrified.

I’m looking at "The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," by Jefferson Davis, Volume 1, page 392. Davis quotes in full from Polk’s September 4 dispatch to him. The wording differs very slightly from the OR’s. Polk explains the situation at Columbus and opposite, and cites the Federal “intention to seize and forcibly possess said town.” He says nothing about Camp Dick Robinson or any other Federal presence in Kentucky. Polk says, “It is my intention to continue to occupy and hold this place.” Davis then writes, “On the same day [September 4] I sent the following reply to Major-General Polk: ‘Your telegram received; the necessity must justify the action.’” The OR version, also dated September 4, has it “The necessity justifies the action.” The Walker order was also on September 4. Davis’ next letter to Polk is dated September 15. In it, he affirms his support of Polk’s presence in Columbus.

Polk’s other explanations for seizing Columbus were public relations. He didn’t need that with Davis.

> stealing boats at Paducah

Was it more than one in this time frame? I have it that only the W. B. Terry was seized at Paducah and found to be carrying contraband South. Paducah people countered by taking the Samuel Orr up the Tennessee River. Ironically, it was the W. B. Terry that broke down when Grant tried to use it to transport troops from Cairo to Paducah. He replaced it with the W. H. Brown.

>> If the Federals had occupied and created a fortress at, say, the Kentucky side of the Cumberland Gap, I think you would have a strong point regarding violation of neutrality to comparable degrees. In my estimation, Grant did not mention Camp Dick Robinson in his memoirs because it was not significant in the overall scheme of things. >>

> One did not need such a fortress as Camp Dick Robinson took care of that portion of Eastern KY.

Your comment does not address my point, which is the degree, the seriousness of the violation. I created a hypothetical as an illustration. In relation to occupying Hickman and Columbus, fortifying the latter and blockading the river, and deploying troops east into Kentucky, establishing Camp Dick Robinson miles from nowhere pales by several degrees of magnitude. I made the same point with my U-2 vs. occupying Moscow analogy, but you didn’t address that correctly either.

> Polk only reacts by doing so after news arrives of Waagner’s movement to Belmont . . . It was entirely due to this movement of the Federals.

That’s right! Polk’s move to Hickman and Columbus was not a tit for tat per Camp Dick Robinson or any other minor violation of Kentucky’s neutrality by the Federals. He wanted to beat Fremont and Grant to the punch. Polk was in Memphis by early July. The Federals established Camp Dick Robinson in early August. Polk occupied Hickman and Columbus in early September. If the occupation was in response to Camp Dick Robinson, Polk would have gone earlier.

> So imagine how much more powerful economically those rivers were to American commerce in 1861? Massively more important and the Confederates knew this.

Yup, the Federals knew it too and so do I.

Doug Fiske