Polk was not enacting CSA policy. He did not write for the record, “The Federals established a training/recruiting camp on a Unionist’s landlocked farm at an insignificant location about 250 miles east of here, therefore I’m going to occupy Hickman and Columbus, establish a fortress at the latter and stretch a chain across the Mississippi.” It was not a tit-for-tat move on Polk’s part.

Polk did write for the record, “. . . I think it of the greatest consequence to the Southern cause that I should be ahead of the enemy in occupying Columbus and Paducah.” His statement reveals he knew of Fremont’s intent to seize Columbus and wanted to beat him to the punch. He gained a temporary military advantage with a move that proved politically fatal. He inadvertently did Fremont and the Federals a big favor.

If the Federals had occupied and created a fortress at, say, the Kentucky side of the Cumberland Gap, I think you would have a strong point regarding violation of neutrality to comparable degrees. In my estimation, Grant did not mention Camp Dick Robinson in his memoirs because it was not significant in the overall scheme of things.

That the Confederates controlled the Mississippi below the Tennessee-Kentucky state line is not relevant. The relevant point is that Kentucky’s alignment was hanging in the balance. Polk thought he could create further dissension and tilt Kentucky to the Confederacy. He misjudged, as the ensuing events proved.

If Polk’s closing the Mississippi at Columbus is a moot point, why did he do it? Debating 150 years later about which side violated Kentucky’s neutrality first and greatest strikes me as academic, but it’s still fun.

Should a subordinate’s friendship with his commander-in-chief have any bearing on whether on not he obeys an order?

Doug