More follows:

>>>>Polk was not enacting CSA policy. He did not write for the record, “The Federals established a training/recruiting camp on a Unionist’s landlocked farm at an insignificant location about 250 miles east of here, therefore I’m going to occupy Hickman and Columbus, establish a fortress at the latter and stretch a chain across the Mississippi.” It was not a tit-for-tat move on Polk’s part.>>>>

I never said he was enacting official CS policy; to the contrary he went against it. However, he DID indeed write a detailed letter to a KY state Senator explaining ALL of his reasons that he moved to Columbus and Camp Dick Robinson is indeed included in that. He had detailed accounts of what the Federals were doing in KY through his network of friends and spies. The Joseph Parks bio of Polk covers much of this. He was fully aware of what was going on there. A letter from C. Wickliffe to Polk (OR 1, Vol. 4, Page 381) makes crystal clear all of what was going on. Dated August 6th, he writes, "We are threatened with invasion by General Prentiss (who was commanding at Cairo and constantly sent men into KY), as he said to two of our citizens Saturday afternoon that after the August election (swept by the pro-Union candidates, boycotted stupidly by the pro-South voters) "Kentucky would go up." Further, he said he was "expecting orders to occupy Kentucky;" also that when his troops came into Kentucky the people should "change to Union men or keep their mouths shut."

Polk's letter is dated September 9th and was written to John M. Johnston, Chairman of Committee, Senate of Kentucky. It can be found on Pages 186-187 of OR I, Vol. 4. Polk lists a number of the Union violations of KY; the only big one he omits were the 5000 "Lincoln guns" smuggled into the state for the Unionist Home Guards raised by the state legislature to counter the KY State Guard, perceived by them to be pro-South (many certainly were but many were not.). These Union guns went to these pro-Union forces. There was no such importation from the south of weapons mostly because they were having more than enough problems equipping troops and had none to spare.

So from Polk's written perspective the move to Columbus was not only a counter to the threat to it from the Federals but indeed a tit for tat for Camp Dick Robinson as well as other clear violations of KY by the Federals.

>>>>Polk did write for the record, “. . . I think it of the greatest consequence to the Southern cause that I should be ahead of the enemy in occupying Columbus and Paducah.” His statement reveals he knew of Fremont’s intent to seize Columbus and wanted to beat him to the punch. He gained a temporary military advantage with a move that proved politically fatal. He inadvertently did Fremont and the Federals a big favor.>>>>

That was his note to Gov. Magoffin and he moved before he got a reply. He indeed did do the Federals a big favor but only because they were totally ignoring what they were doing from their side with the incursions, stealing boats at Paducah, the "Lincoln guns," Camp Dick Robinson, etc. In their own way their deletion of this from their own complaints about what Polk was doing smacks very much of the Stalinization of history in his Stalin's Soviet Union much later - delete what does not fit the program, or as George Orwell so succinctly put it, "Eurasia has always been at war with Eastasia."

Just because the Federals lied through their teeth about their side of things and painted Polk as the big culprit does not get them off the historical hook whatsoever. I used to think that Polk was the big culprit many years ago until I started serious research into this and related events. The historic record does not support the Union, and many historian's views, that it all comes down on Polk's shoulders. The governors of Illinois, Indiana and Ohio all agitated for invading Kentucky throughout the summer of 1861 despite the alleged honoring of the state's neutrality declaration. This is why Magoffin was so upset, as were more moderate Unionist Kentuckians, when Bull Nelson, who had been proposing an armed offensive into East TN (there is a detailed letter on this in the OR), opened Camp Dick Robinson. It was a flagrant violation and completely counter to the early camps that were set up outside of the state - as ALL of the Confederate camps were.

>>>>If the Federals had occupied and created a fortress at, say, the Kentucky side of the Cumberland Gap, I think you would have a strong point regarding violation of neutrality to comparable degrees. In my estimation, Grant did not mention Camp Dick Robinson in his memoirs because it was not significant in the overall scheme of things.>>>>

One did not need such a fortress as Camp Dick Robinson took care of that portion of Eastern KY. From there the Union movements to Barboursville, Camp Wildcat and Mill Springs all came and even to the gap itself. This is where George Thomas started all of these events. Had it not been there at all, as it should not have been if the Union truly sought not to violate the state's neutrality, then those movements would have had to come from Cincinnati, much further away.

Grant left it out simply because he knew that it was indeed part of the bigger picture but did not wish to acknowledge it, which
was the same for most of the upper level Union commanders of the time. Eastasia has always been at war with Eurasia.

>>>That the Confederates controlled the Mississippi below the Tennessee-Kentucky state line is not relevant. The relevant point is that Kentucky’s alignment was hanging in the balance. Polk thought he could create further dissension and tilt Kentucky to the Confederacy. He misjudged, as the ensuing events proved.>>>>

Polk's words counter this completely. He was fully engaged with the arming of New Madrid/Island No. 10/Tiptonville in early August as being an important cork in the Mississippi River. See his OR correspondence. He did so and stated so as he fully knew that this was going to be the main Union axis of advance as indeed it would be. Polk was not a great general but he was not completely stupid. While Pillow was the prime agitator, starting in May, of going to Columbus, Polk only reacts by doing so after news arrives of Waagner's movement to Belmont, not because of what he had thought or Pillow had thought. It was entirely due to this movement of the Federals.

Polk still needed to wait for the proper authority to make the movement and, in this, he is guilty indeed. Military officers do not create political policy; they are supposed to follow political policy. Camp Dick Robinson had already started something moving and Polk should have waited to see if Grant was going to move there or Paducah first. The thing is the Federals HAD to move into Kentucky at some point in order to get to Tennessee and the Deep South on a broad front advance. A channelized move down the Mississippi River could have been easily defeated while a broad front was much tougher. As it was the Federals did use the broad front mo0vement; Grant down the twin rivers and Buell down the L & N RR towards Nashville. What they perhaps did not follow up on as much as they should have was a full court press in the media, etc. about Camp Dick Robinson and even make veiled threats that if this camp was not removed then a possible counter-attack was possible. Diplomacy for the CSA was not one of its strong points however.

>>>If Polk’s closing the Mississippi at Columbus is a moot point, why did he do it? Debating 150 years later about which side violated Kentucky’s neutrality first and greatest strikes me as academic, but it’s still fun. Should a subordinate’s friendship with his commander-in-chief have any bearing on whether on not he obeys an order? >>>

Columbus offered a further closing of the river. It was already closed with the secession of Tennessee and Arkansas alone. Read the correspondence of Union Congressmen to Lincoln from Illinois, Iowa, Indiana, Wisconsin and Minnesota with regards to the closing of this river. Their farmers were going to starve if their crops could not get down to New Orleans, which was the Number One export port in the USA according to the 1860 Census. Over 1000 steamboats plied the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers carrying commerce. I live on the Cumberland River in Tennessee and tons of barge traffic still uses these rivers today. In 1814, British General Robert Packenham stated, "to control the Mississippi is to control North America." That was his reason for going after New Orleans. So imagine how much more powerful economically those rivers were to American commerce in 1861? Massively more important and the Confederates knew this.

So even closing the river at Tennessee and Arkansas alone was more than sufficient; Columbus was the bonus. But one huge mistake followed there. Some 142 heavy guns were eventually placed at Columbus which was supported by forts further south to Memphis. Ft. Henry had only 17; Ft. Donelson 11,; Clarksville 6 guns in two small forts and Nashville only 8 guns in a battery west of the city in a bend of the river. So the overwhelming placing of this amount of guns took away needed guns for the eventual Union route of advance; down the two other rivers. Grant fully knew this thanks to excellent recon by subordinates. One does not go strength on strength; you look to turn it.

What I meant by the friendship between Polk and Davis was I think that Polk felt that by disobeying stated political policy, Davis would have his back because of that friendship. It took a few days for Davis to come out and say anything on this after Walker ordered him out and Magoffin asked him to leave. Even Isham Harris was horrified.

Greg Biggs