Lee had the task of taking over an army that was exhausted and in disarray. His inexperience and lack of familiarity of the area and intelligence about enemy forces should have been clear to Hood before he placed him in command. That was Hood's reponsibility. The mistakes Lee made were his own.
When you look at the first week of Hood's command; three ill-advised, poorly planned and disastrous defeats occurred. [Peachtree Creek July 20th, Atlanta July 22nd, and Ezra Church July 28th]. His only successes were Cleburne's holding of Bald Hill and Brown's division [notably Sharp's and manigault's Brigades]routing of the center along the Augusta RR on the 22nd, and he gets credit for those to a point. Just like Lee, these commanders had orders during a battle, they were just successful.
This is my opinion and that and $4 (used to be 10 cents) will get you a cup of coffee:
Hood's ability to command an Army that did not trust him (Generals as well as enlisted), a remote command style(Rarely within sight of the action-in some cases miles from the attacking forces), last minute changes to battle plans with little control over communications (attack orders delayed and confusing at both Peachtree Creek and Atlanta), worn out troops [Battle of Peachtree Creek 20th on left of line, Bald Hill on the 21st in the center on the east side of Atlanta and a forced march around the south of Atlanta with an almost impossible time frame on the 22nd] led to defeats.
Add then a battle plan on the 22nd that resulted in the collapse of the federal center after a failure on the right, and if launched simultaneously as planned or an hour earlier could have destroyed the center and left of the federal line. Had Cheatham and Brown attacked while Dodge/McPherson were being attacked, the break through and routing of the three divisions in the center by Sharp's and Manigault's Brigades could possibly have been supported. Instead, Hood could only order retreat after the federal artillery only had to focus on one section of the field instead of along the whole line. The saddest part of all these defeats is that every section of trench these men were ordered to take was a fortification they had built in preparation for the coming battles and that they had to leave just prior to the battle on July 21st and 22nd.
Now add a week later and blame Lee for attacking after all he had seen Hood do was attack and in most cases without intelligence, poor communications and a 'worn out' force. Sorry, but this is not a case of a general having to take the credit or discredit for the actions of his subordinates, i.e. Westmoreland. Hood's style was to attack when he thought he could win [Kolb's farm]and to not attack when he might be defeated [Resaca, Canton Rd.-Cassville, New hope Church, etc.] As an opportunist, he made moves to get the command of the army, but as a strategic and tactical leader, he completely blew his opportunity, and with it, the army. Others may disagree, but command requires leadership during the battle not after action blame. viv. Hood and S.D. Lee both blamed others.