"First, it is my understanding that General Price spent a significant amount of time and resources fortifying an area in North Little Rock that ran roughly from the river and through dark hollow, with some artillery on park hill."

This is as far as I can determine, An I am no expert on the battle of Little Rock, correct. The Confederates had been looking at this defensive line as early as May of 1862 when Van Dorn abandoned Arkansas completely and Union General Samuel Curtis had his eyes fixed upon attempting the capture the entire State at that time. Of Course that is another story. But the point is that the confederates were well aware of the terrain and the approaches to Little Rock from that direct and fortified accordingly.

"I further have read that it was known that the river could be forded at several locations south of Little Rock, therefore rendering the North Little Rock fortifications and such an effort on the fortifications ill advised. Is this information accurate?"

Again this is mostly true. Arkansas had been in an extended drought in 1862, which with only some short breaks during the winter of 1862/63 continued into the summer of 1863. There are a number of accounts of the low water levels on the Arkansas River. In fact when the CSS Ponchartrain was burned at Little Rock when the Confederates so hastely abandoned the city, She burned for two days because with a 10 foot draft she could not sink. She was resting on the bottom of the Arkansas River in her moorings.

However this low water did not necessarily in and of itself render the North Little Rock fortification ill advised. The Arkansas River is a delta river. In most places it is broad and shallow until it was channelized in the 1960's. Even now the channel depth is only maintained at 12 feet depth. As a delta river its bottom is mostly mud and silt.

The problem with an army in "fording" any river, without building a pontoon bridge, in the 1860, was to find a place that was shallow enough, no more that 3 or 4 feet deep, with a hard enough bottom to support the 2 Ton artillery piece and their limbers and cassions, and that bottom not be too badly torn up by the traffic crossing on it, AND finally having banks with a low enough slope that you could get all of this into the river and then out on the other side.

So while a single man might be able to cross a river "anywhere", or a cavalry column would have no problems in crossing, an entire army is another thing entirely.

Now don't get me wrong David I am not picking on you, but I want to use someting you said as a teaching tool for other who may read this.

You Commented: "rendering the North Little Rock fortifications ... ill advised"

Now I have a couple of questions. First, what is the purpose of building fortifications? Second, if fortification accomplish their purpose are they "ill advised"?

In answer to the first question as to the purpose of building fortification the general reply in the common non military thinking mind, one would say to defend a specific point or place of military or political, in this case, value. And in the simplest form that would be true. But Military minds know that any fixed fortification can be overcome, IF the enemy is will to take the time and expend the cost to reduce those fortification.

So to the military mind the purpose of building fortifications is not to necessarily repell an attack, but to ultimately say this place is too costly to attack. Are you willing to pay the cost? And if not go somewhere else with your army if you don't want to pay that cost. That is exactly what Steele did. He went somewhere else. Now, If the fortification then causes the enemy to go somewhere else and look for another opening and oppertunity to attack, were the fortification "ineffective and Ill-Advised"?

You see Steele was in a poor situation on September 1st, 1863. His army was not large enough to attack those fortification with any assurance that he could take that position. He also didn't have enough men to try a prolonged seige and couldn't invest Little Rock with the men he had. If he moved to his right, to the North of the Confederates, he ran a dangerous risk of being cut off and isolated himself. The only two way he could move was either retreat back to Brownsville, and he could not stay there for long because winter would not be long in coming, and Price would probably be reenforced if given enough time. Or to the South for whatever reason. Which is what I am hoping to find out.

So Steele's only options on the 1st of September was either #1 attack head on against those fortification, or #2 Abandon the expedition and return to Helena, or #3 flank to the south for whatever reason and hope for an oppertunity. We know his choice and we known the oppertunity that revealed itself.

But Steele could not have foreseen that oppertunity with surety. And if he had been beaten in open battle where would he have gone?

But enough of my ramblings.

As for your second question:

"Secondly, though I have not lived in Arkansas in many years, I grew up in North Little Rock and I remember my Daddy driving me by an old plantation house on the old Memphis Highway and telling me that two Confederate Generals fought a duel there. I must assume that the location is where the Marmaduke-Walker duel happened. It was in an area of town known as Rose City. If so, does the house still stand and/or is there a maker to designate the site."

The Walker-Maraduke duel is evidently what your father was talking about, but I have no Idea if that house is still standing.

Doyle