You said: "I did not mean to suggest that Steele was attempting to move south of Little Rock and cut off Price's retreat, only that it might have APPEARED that way to Price from his vantage point inside the city."

Appearents and perceptions are often treated as facts in the practical world. I am sure that Price really did not expect Steele to attack his prepared fortification head-on. That is usually a fast ditch effort or when commanders have no other choice. The standard method of operation for a Steele when facing an entreanched and fortified enemy would be to flank that position to one side or the other.

To have flanked the Bayou Meto fortification to the North would place Steele in even more of a precarious situation if he got cut off from his support at Brownsville. So it was a obvious move for Steele to move around to the south of those fortifications. Price should have expected that move. And maybe he did. And probably Steele expected Price to expect such a move. That just basic military tactics 101. It is simple from a military standpoint.

Second you said: "One last half-baked thought: Given the swelling tide of Unionist/defeatist sentiment in Arkansas after the disasters at Prairie Grove, Arkansas Post, and Helena, would it not be likely that Steele received information from INSIDE Little Rock regarding Confederate strength, defenses, intentions?"

I am certain that Steele had INSIDE information. There are just too many references in the O.R.'s of Contriband and other intel sources giving information to Union authorities such as Commander Selfridge commanding the gunboats blockading and patroling the mouth of the Arkansas and White rivers. But Price knew this also and in fact sent contribands with false information also. That is a balance from Steele's standpoint. Steele would have been a fool to have acted upon such information alone. Yes the Confederates were demoralized, but they also were defending their homes at their back. That is different from fighting in the open fields and attacking the enemies fortifications.

In any case Steele still would have been foolhardy to attack Prices fortifications head on. Taking such fortifications no matter how weak, of any kind, is an operation which requires skill and the dedication of the attacking troops. And it is always expected to be a costly operation and could destroy an attacking army even if they took the position. Fortifications give the defender a sence of courage and the defenders a sence of dred and foreboding. It is just not a good idea to attack fortifications head-on no matter what your intel is unless you have an absolute lock on the situation, something that no commander ever has.

Also in this situation Steele would have known that Price would have the advantage of the interior lines. No matter which way Steele flanked those Little Rock fortifications Price would have the shorter distants to travel to counter Steeles efforts. This is one reason I believe that Steele was not really intending to attack Little Rock at all. He would have expected Price to come out and counter him. and He Steele would have to force a crossing of the Arkansas River somewhere probably under fire to attack Little Rock from the south.

IF Steele was changing his base of operations to Pine Bluff, I can not even imagine why he was even interested in crossing the Arkansas River until he got to maybe White Bluff or below. Except that he knew Price could parallel his movements on the west side of the Arkansas and oppose his crossing anywhere.