WILDERNESS AND COLD HARBOR

CHAPTER XIV

IN writing so far I have omitted camp life almost entirely, speaking only of campaigns and battles. The greater portion of our time was spent in the intervals between battles, and of course there were a great many occurrences, of unusual interest in these camp experiences, but to speak of them would extend this sketch beyond reasonable limits. We had two doctors attached to our battalion. One went with us from home when we enlisted. He enlisted as a private, but had been a druggist at home and I presume knew something of medicine. At any rate he prosecuted his medical studies in camp and was promoted to the position of surgeon. The other came from Maryland and was assigned to our battalion. His name was Montgomery, while our home man was named Pearson. One winter an allotment of whiskey was sent over to our battalion for medical purposes and turned over to our doctors, they having-charge of the medical department. Human nature being weak they were tempted beyond the power of resistance, and were led to indulge too freely after once testing it to see if it was a proper article for the sick, and as a consequence they got drunk. Presently they got into a hot dis (Page 119) pute, and from that into a fight, and Dr. Pearson struck Dr. Montgomery over the eye cutting a considerable gash and knocking him down. Soldiers in camp were soon on to it and at every opportunity proceeded to guy the doctors. At night when everything was still, lights out and darkness lending its kindly aid, some mischievous fellow with voice disguised would call out at the top of his voice, "Who cut a half moon over Dr. Montgomery's eye?" Some one in another part of camp would make reply, "Dr. Pearson." And thus it would go around camp to the delectation of the soldiers. For nights and nights they would go through this performance to the disgust of the two surgeons and the amusement of those engaged. This I am sure would not have taken place but for the fact that these doctors had rendered themselves unpopular by themselves consuming that which was placed in their care for the benefit of the men in the ranks. Some of our officers got hold of some of that whiskey and became very warm and exceedingly familiar towards their men. One morning after drill one of the lieutenants, who had been a lawyer at home before he went out as a soldier, mounted a box and proceeded to make a spread-eagle speech. He loved his company, every man in it, and he wished his arms were long enough that he might take them all in his fond embrace. Becoming warmed up in (Page 120) his harangue he pointed his extended finger towards the sunrise and exclaimed,

"Behold in the east the rising star,

That proclaims the end of this unholy war." That was short, but it touched a responsive chord and brought down the house and he was so lustily cheered that he was forced to desist He afterward resigned and returned to Alabama.

On April 4, 1864, we broke camp and marched out on the plank road toward the wilderness, where on the 5th of April, '64, began the campaign which continued almost without cessation down to Appomattox, April 9, 1865. On this march from Orange Court House Gen. Lee's men were in the best of spirits. I never saw a command move off more spiritedly and crack jokes in a lighter humor. Of course we knew what was coming. We were too well versed in war not to know, yet all seemed determined to enjoy it while we could, and casting care to the winds we hurried on to meet Gen. Grant and his -great host without a tremor. When we reached the wilderness where Gen. Lee had determined to intercept Gen. Grant and fight it out with him there in the almost impenetrable woods, we found the troops who had preceded us in a death grapple with Grant's advance lines. My battalion was detached from the brigade and deployed in skirmish line in the rear of Hill's corps to catch all (Page 121) skulkers and shirkers and take them back to their commands-an important work and fraught with much danger. I was on the plank road with a detachment, when Long-street's corps came up to join his forces with those of A. P. Hill, and I never saw finer looking troops in all my war experience. They came forward in a swinging gait, every man grasping his gun with a firm grip, their heads erect and eyes flashing, everything denoting determination. As the head of the column reached the point where I was, Gen. Lee met them on his old iron gray horse. He seemed unusually anxious and as he spoke to the men there was a slight commotion for a minute or two and then the troops moved away into the woods. I am sure this was the time and occasion when Lee proposed leading them into the charge and it is said a Texas soldier stepped out and caught his bridle rein and turned his horse around and said, "Lee to the rear! We will drive them back!" As they entered the wood to the right pandemonium broke loose. It was a musketry battle, as artillery could not be used on account of the thickets, and the roar of small arms was terrific. Up to this time A. P. Hill had stood-alone contending with overwhelming odds. He was being forced back and help had come in the nick of time. The tide of battle had fluctuated, first one side and then the other gaining the ascendancy, and Hill's soldiers were hard (Page 122) pressed to hold their own against the vast hordes of the enemy's troops hurled against them. But when Longstreet's men swung into action there was a perceptible change at once and the enemy were forced to give ground. This battle of the wilderness was a stubborn contest, but on the whole victory was on our side, and we were not surprised to learn that Gen. Grant was moving off to his left, thus showing a decided change of mind on his part in regard to his route to Richmond. The route he at first designed to follow was too full of "Hills", and too many rough "Long-streets", so he proposed to seek another. I think we privates and under officers fully understood and appreciated the situation. Gen. Grant seemed to admit Gen. Lee's superiority as a strategist and simply designed to overcome the Southern forces by mere force of numbers. He freely admitted this as his -policy when he said he would overcome by the simple method of attrition. With 140,000 men he could afford to lose two to one in a contest with 60,000 and yet come out ahead with 20,000. That was only an arithmetical calculation and Gen. Grant seemed to have adhered to it in his campaigns against Gen. Lee. It was a cruel and hardhearted policy, but it was the only way to whip the army of Gen. Lee and Gen. Grant stuck to it to the end, and finally succeeded as a matter of course. With no exchange of prisoners, and (Page 123) the South without any means of recruiting her shattered ranks, while the armies of the North were being constantly augmented from her ample resources both at home and abroad, it was only a matter of time as to who should succeed.

After the Wilderness there was a race for Spotsylvania whither Gen. Grant withdrew. Our cavalry were the first on the ground and did heroic service to hold it until Lee's invincibles had time to come up. The infantry moved rapidly to the rescue of the cavalry and had just time to get into position when the terrible struggle of Spotsylvania Court House was on in all its fury. On the 10th of May, 1864, Gen. Grant seemed determined to break through Gen. Lee's left and all day long he hurled his brigades against that part of our lines with a dogged determination to break through at all hazards, but when night came the tired Rebels still held their lines intact. Probably ten or twelve separate attacks had been made during the day at this point and always with fresh troops, while the same heroic soldiers stood the brunt from morning to night on our side and their ranks were still unbroken. Just as night began to fall and our men were trying to refresh their weary bodies from their scanty store of provisions, with guns stacked, some trying to fry a little bacon ver their hastily kindled fires and some snatching a little sleep, while thus entirely off (Page 124) their guard a fresh body of the enemy were upon them, taking them wholly unawares and killed and wounded a number and ran the rest out of their position. It was at this critical stage that the Richmond Howitzers, one of our crack batteries, swung their guns around and with full charges of canister at short range poured in a terrific shower of missiles into the blue ranks huddled in confusion after their charge. This told with fearful effect and produced consternation among them. Our infantry then rallied and rushed back to their guns and completed the work already begun by the artillery, and this completed the day's work for May 10,1864. Probably never in the world's history has the heroic conduct of Lee's infantry at this point been surpassed. Our troops here were composed of Texans and Georgians, and were regarded as among the best in the army. It is said that during the day as they met the determined onsets of the foe and with well-directed rifle fire would drive them back, they would mount their little earth protection and shout to the fleeing Federals to come nearer next time as they disliked to walk so far after their shoes and clothing left behind in their flight. The 12th of May, 1864, at Spotsylvania is considered the pivotal day in this great battle and the "Bloody Angle", as it is called, was the spot where the fire of musketry has never been surpassed on this terrestrial globe. Pine trees several feet (Page 125) in diameter were literally cut off and felled by minnie balls; that is, the thousands of minnie balls constantly striking and penetrating a pine tree would fell it to the ground, thus demonstrating the severity of the rifle fire. This battle has been often described, and I make no attempt to describe it. But I was there in touch with it throughout its progress. My battalion was deployed here as at the Wilderness to catch all who straggled or shirked from the immediate front and hold them until they could be returned to their places in the ranks. This is Provost Guard duty, and an important work it is, and requires vigilance and diligence constantly. There were always demoralized soldiers coming from the fighting line seeking safety in the rear. By every artifice known to man they would manage to slip from their place on the front and it was provost duty to intercept them and at the earliest possible moment guard them back to their regimental officers. An incident occurred in this battle of the 12th of May which though related by another yet I insert it here. A Federal soldier from Maine had been shot through the chest by a canister shot, which meant death. As a rough Texas captain passed near him, he caught hold of the captain's trousers and said, "Can you pray? Can you pray?" "No that is out of my line", replied the old captain as he looked on him with a mad expression. Just then the chaplain, on his er (Page 126) rand of mercy, came up and the man from Maine caught him by the leg and repeated, "Can you pray? Can you pray?" The chaplain knelt and directed the dying man to repeat after him these words, "God have mercy on me, a sinner, for Jesus Christ's sake." He uttered them again and again and died with these words on his lips. Was he saved? He was so earnest and intent on having a prayer and so eager to catch at the last straw, I feel and think my Lord heard and rescued him even at the last hour.

Gen. Grant continued to move by the flank, always confronted by our army whenever he turned his face toward Richmond, and always with such a solid front that he was loathe to join issue. At Cold Harbor he again attempted to break through and force a passage by that route, but again he was foiled. Two battles were fought at Cold Harbor. One in 1862, which I have already described and this one in 1864. In the first we were the attacking party, but now the Federals made the attack. We occupied now almost identically the ground they occupied then. The whole situation was reversed. In '62 we drove them and captured their position completely. Not so now. They utterly failed to even shake our line. We were in line of battle here at Cold Harbor from June 1 to June 12, twelve days, but the grand climax was of short duration and was most sanguinary in its results to the (Page 127) Federal troops. They made one final effort to break our lines by a grand charge, with several lines following behind one another, the very weight of the movement seeming to insure success. And it would have succeeded had the men against whom it was directed been ordinary soldiers. But such was not the case, and this charge was repulsed with terrible slaughter. Thirteen thousand men were left on the field, dead or wounded. They admit this as their loss while ours did not exceed thirteen hundred. Gen. Grant endeavored to renew this attack, but his troops refused to budge. This is a fact freely admitted by the officers on their side, and I think it was so stated by Gen. Grant himself. The results of this one battle, being so one sided, appealed to the Northern people more forcibly than anything that occurred during the war, and Gen. Grant's iron nerves were more shaken than at any other time of his life. Gen. Meade said that the Confederacy came nearer winning recognition at Cold Harbor than at any other period of the four years' struggle. "The entire North was depressed and on receipt of Gen. Grant's telegram from the front it is said that the Federal cabinet resolved upon an armistice and Mr. Seward was selected to draw up the papers and Mr. Swinton was to prepare the public mind for what was coming." From this day on Gen. Grant changed his tactics and instead of butting his brains (Page 128) out against solid walls erected by Gen. Lee, he resorted to dirt digging. He shifted the scene by moving away to his left across the James River to Petersburg, endeavoring to reach Richmond from that side, even if he had to resort to a regular siege. Before leaving Cold Harbor and the Wilderness, let me quote from Maj. Styles, thus-"The campaign covered, say 60 miles and 30 days time. Gen. Lee had under 64,000 men of all arms present for duty at the outset, and put hors de combat of Grant's army an equal number man for man. Mr. Swinton, page 482 of his Army of the Potomac', puts Grant's loss at above 60,000 men, so that Grant lost in killed and wounded and prisoners more than a thousand men to the mile, and more than two thousand men per day during the campaign. Again Lee had, as stated, at the start present for duty less than 64,000 men and received 14,400 men as reinforcements. So that first and last he had under his command in this campaign 78,400 men; while Grant had at the start present for duty 141,160 men and the reinforcements he received numbered 51,000 men; so that from first to last he had under his command in this campaign, say 192,160 men. Now Grant's one desire was to turn Lee's either flank, preferably his right flank, and thus get between him and Richmond. To accomplish this purpose with his preponderance of numbers, he might have left man for man in Lee's front, (Page 129) and at the same time throw an army of 77,000 to 114,000 on his flank; and yet he utterly failed to get around or to crush that inevitable, indomitable flank. From what I have read and heard of Gen. Grant and the opinion I have formed of him, it is my belief that if this Proposition had been put to him he would have admitted candidly that he would not have dared to leave man for man in Lee's front; that it would have been utterly unsafe for him to do so. Well, he might have left two to one in front of Lee and still have had free, from 13,000 to 36,000 with which to turn his flank-and yet he utterly failed to turn it. The figures here used are those of Col. Walter Taylor and are less favorable to Gen. Lee than those of most Confederate authorities upon the war. Gen. Early, for example, says that Lee at the outset had less than 50,000 effective of all arms under his command. Set opposite this picture just sketched that of Lee holding the front of Hooker's 92,000, with scant 14,000 muskets while with about one third his numbers he utterly crushed the right flank and rear of Hooker's great host. It should not be forgotten in this connection and in endeavoring to form a just estimate of Gen. Lee's operations throughout this campaign of '64 that in the death of Jackson, Lee had lost his great offensive right arm to which at Chancellorsville and theretofore, he had looked to carry into execution his confounding strate (Page 130) gies and his overpowering, resistless attacks. So much for Maj. Styles, and I endorse it every word. Gen. Badeau wrote a life of Gen. Grant and was a great admirer of him, and in this life he in effect says Grant did not maneuver against the Army of Northern Virginia because he found maneuvering of no avail against that army. That is praise sufficient from a foe. (Page 131)

Family Record and War Reminiscences
by William Frierson Fulton, Jr.
Livingston, AL, 1919
Transcribed by James W. Martin