Oct. 26th, Grant to Halleck --
You have never suggested to me any plan of operations in this
department and as I do not know anything of those of commanders to my
right or left. I have none therefore that is not independent of all
others forces than those under my immediate command ... As situated
now, with no more troops, I can do nothing but defend my positions, and
I do not feel at liberty to abandon any of them without first
consulting you.
Nov. 2nd, Grant to Halleck --
I have commenced a movement on Grand Junction with three divisions from
Corinth and two from Bolivar. Will leave here tomorrow evening and
take command in person. If found practicable I will go on to Holly
Springs and maybe Grenada completing Railroad & Telegraph as I go ...
Nov. 3rd, Halleck to Grant --
I approve of your plan of advancing upon the enemy as soon as you are
strong enough for that purpose ... I hope for an active campaign on the
Mississippi this fall.
Nov. 3rd, Grant to Sherman --
... start toward Grenada repairing the road [railroad from Memphis] as
the troops advance.
Nov. 8th, Grant to Halleck --
Reinforcements arriving very slowly ... one regiment has yet reached
Memphis.
Nov. 9th, Gen. Tuttle to Grant --
I have sent [the regiments] all to Columbus [from Cairo] by order of
General Davies. I don't know what he has done with them -- I find some
regiments with a kind of loose order to report to General McClernand.
Nov. 10th, Halleck to Grant --
Five regiments and one battery left Ill for Memphis last week ...
Memphis will be made the depot for a joint military & naval expedition
on Vicksburg.
Nov. 10th, Grant to Halleck --
Am I to understand that I lay still here while an expedition is fitted
out from Memphis or do you want me to push as far south as possible?
Am I to have Sherman move subject to my order or is he & his forces
reserved for some special service?
Nov. 10th, Halleck to Grant --
You have command of all troops sent to your department, and permission
to fight the enemy when you please.
Nov. 12th, Grant to Halleck --
If it is the intention to permit this column push South by the
Mississippi Central road, and supply it from Memphis by way of the
Miss. & Tenn. road after reaching Grenada it will be necessary to have
six additional locomotives ...
Nov. 13th, Grant to Halleck --
Twelve additional locomotives are required to supply the army.
Nov. 13th, Halleck to Grant --
Twelve additional locomotives cannot be sent to you for they cannot be
procured without seriously deranging other lines. It is not advisable
to put rail roads in operation south of Memphis. Operations in
northern Miss. must be limited to rapid marches upon any collected
forces of the enemy ... the enemy must be turned by a movement down the
river from Memphis as soon as a sufficient force can be collected.
Nov. 15th, Grant to George G. Pride --
Orders from Washington [have changed my] plans. No work will be
commenced from Memphis.
Nov. 23rd, Halleck to Grant --
Report approximate number of men in your command, and number that can
be sent down the river to Vicksburg, reserving merely enough to hold
Corinth and West Tennessee.
Nov. 24th, Grant to Halleck --
Sherman will move on Wednesday and form junction with my forces south
of Holly Springs on Sunday next. Must I countermand the order for this
movement? It is too late to reach [him] before they will have moved.
Nov. 25th, Halleck to Grant --
Proposed movements approved, do not go too far.
Dec. 4th, Grant to Halleck --
How far south would you like me to go? ... with my present force it
would not be safe to go beyond Grenada ...
Dec. 5th, Halleck to Grant --
... you should not attempt to hold the country south of the
Tallahatchie ... your main object should be to hold the line from
Memphis to Corinth with as small a force as possible, while the largest
number possible is thrown upon Vicksburg with the gunboats.
By the time Van Dorn destroyed Holly Springs, Grant was merely trying to hold Pemberton in place while Sherman led the thrust down the river. If Sherman had managed to make a lodgement on the bluffs north of Vicksburg, the Confederate position at Grenada would have been turned and Grant would have marched to meet Sherman, either inland or along the Yazoo system depending on the level of Sherman's success. Sherman's expedition, however, was doomed to failure. Effectively, Grant's attempt to initiate an overland campaign had been subverted and replaced by Lincoln and Halleck's riverine campaign by the time Van Dorn destroyed Holly Springs.