Feb. 6, 1865

The Federals

On Feb. 5th Humphreys and his II Corps with the support of Wheaton's division ov the VI Corps and Hartranft's division of the IX Corps still held the ground they had just

seized east of Hatcher's Run despite rebel attacks. Meade was content to accept the status quo. If the Federals held decided to fortify their positions east of Hatcher's

Run, they would have extended their main line three additional miles.

At 9 p. m. Meade sent a message to Humphreys:

I have directed Major-General Warren, with the Fifth Corps and Greggs cavalry, to report to you and to withdraw to this point. With these troops and the divisions of the

Sixth and Ninth Corps I wish you to hold your present position, extending as far as possible toward our line of works. Should the enemy attack you again and be repulsed,

or,if circumstances justify it, I wish you to attack him and drive him, if practicable, into his works. (Meade to Humphreys 9 p.m. Feb. 5, 1865 OR Vol. 46, Part 1, p. 396)

However at 7;15 p.m. Grant ordered Meade to push for the southside railroad the next day, apparently by attacking the rebel fortifications. Grant wrote, "Bring Warren and

the cavalry back, and if you can follow the enemy up do it. If we can follow the enemy up, although it was not contemplated before, it may lead to getting the South Side

road, or a position from which it can be reached. Change original instructions to give all advantages you can take of the enemys acts.
Grant to Meade 7:15 p.m Feb. 5, 1865 OR Vol. 46, Part 2, p. 390)

Grant's addiction to action in this case is reminiscent of Grant's behavior after Warren repulsed the Confederates at Clob Tavern on August 21st. Rather than wait for the

Feederals to consolidate their hold on the ground just seized, Grant succumbed to his need for ceaseless action. Accordingly he sent the II Corps down to Ream's Station.

Tearing up a few miles of railroad would not effect the siege one way or another. But even if the expedition of the II Corps had proved important, the risk to the Ujion

troops outweighed any posssible gain. The II Corps suffered its worst defeat of the war when it was routed and driven from the railroad. Hundreds of men were lost to no

purpose.

Meade replied, "I have withdrawn Warren and the cavalry to this point, directing two divisions to remain on the other side of the run, one to cross to this side as a reserve

for contingencies. Humphreys is instructed to await developments, and to attack, if advantageous, aud drive the enemy into their works. The enemy have a strong line of works

passing through the Clements house; this house is the place where the shot fell near us on the last movementthat is to say, since then the enemy have advanced their line.

Unless we can carry this line we can hardly reach the Boydton plank road or South Side Railroad without a flank movement considerably to the left. I presume it was to stop

this they attacked Ilumplireys right. Meade 7:15 p.m Feb. 5, 1865 OR Vol. 46, Part 2, p. 390)

Late that night Grant telegramed Meade: "Please report to me the situation of our troops now and of the enemy's forces, so far as you know it; also state what you propose

for the mornings movement. I would not advise any withdrawal in the morning, nnless forced to it. We should either carry ont the first design or else meet the enemy outside

his intrenchments. (Grant to Meade Feb. 5, 1865, received 10:25 p.m., OR Vol. 46, Part 2, p. 591)

Meade replied with an account of what had happened that day, that because it had become necessary to maintain communications with the line to the east, he had ordered up one

division of the IX and one division ov the VI Corps. He chose to ignore the part of Grant's communication and concentrated instead on meeting the rebels outside their

fortificaitons. He concluded, "In the morning if I find this force of the enemy is outside of his works, I shall attack and drive him into them, taking advantage of

anything disclosed by the operations." (Meade to Grant 11:15 p.m. Feb. 6, 1865 OR Vol. 46, Part 2, p.391-392)

At 7:50 a.m. on Feb. 6th Meade ordered Humphreys and Warren to feel the enemy in their fronts. The orders anticipated Warren's crossing to the west side of Hatcher's Run,

an event that soon took place. The two generals drive any Confederates theyu encountered into their works If the Confederates were in their works there was to be no

assault. Humphreys carried out his orders and by 11 a.m. had accomplished his mission. Warreh, however, merely crossed to the west side of Hatcher's Run and remained at

his bridgehead.

At 12:15 the Army of the Potomac's chief of staff, general webb, informed Warren that he had misinterpreted Meade's order of 7:45 a.m. He, as welol as Humphreys, was

expected to reconnoiter to see if the rebels were in his front.

Meade met with Warren around this time at his headQUrters within the UInion breastworks near the crossing of Hatcher's Run. He ordered him to find the rebel earthworks at

Dabney's Mill to the north. At 1:15 Warren ordered Crawford to take his 3rd ivision up the Vaughan road to the Dabney Mill Road and to drive back the rebels outside their

works. He sent Ayres and his two brigades of the 2nd Division to follow Crawford. (Warren's report oR Vol. 46, Part 1, p. 255)

This historian believes that Meade erred greatly in dividing his army in the face of an aggressive enemy who could attack Warren's isolated corps with two corps of their

own. It is difficult to understand what motivated Meade to make such a rash decision. It would have made more sense to consolidate the ground gained east of Hatcher's Run

before crossing to the west bank. Surely, there was no great hurry to scout the rebel position. The only explnation seems to be that Meade made his decision because Grant

was convinced that action, any kind of action, even ill suited action, was preferable to intrenching and strengthening positions.

Bryce A. SUderow