The remarkable thing about July 27th is that only three days before Burnside's attack, Meade and Grant were only beginning to discuss it.

In the middle of the morning a false alarm stirred up quite a bit of excitement among the Army of the Potomac’s high command. Col. J.B. McIntosh, commanding the 1st brigade of Wilson’s 3rd cavalry Division picketed the left of the army besieging Petersburg, a large area stretching from the Jerusalem Plank Road to the Weldon Railroad. Since he had replaced Alger’s Michigan Brigade the previous day and was new to this post, he ordered Lt. Col. Bacon of the 5th New York Cavalry to send a small patrol down the Jerusalem Plank Road early in the morning. The troopers reported to Bacon that they had encountered a small mounted force of Confederates and about 500 Confederate infantry in the vicinity of Lee’s Mill, near the junction of the road to ream’s Station and the Jerusalem Plank Road. Bacon sent the scouting report to McIntosh.

McIntosh passed the report along to Maj. Gen. Andrew Humphreys, the Army of the Potomac’s Chief of Staff. . McIntosh also stated that his scouts had found that it was almost impossible to probe the area along the Weldon Railroad since the Confederates “seem to be in our immediate front.” Ordinarily McIntosh would have reported the news to Wilson or to Sheridan, but apparently Wilson was unavailable and since Sheridan was absent on the expedition north of the James, McIntosh passed the information directly on to Humphreys (McIntosh to Humphreys July 27, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Part 3, p. 533)

Meade tied together two pieces of information to reach a faulty conclusion. There was news that Confederate trains had run trains all night. He pieced this together with McIntosh’s erroneous report. He concluded that the Confederates had noticed the absence of Hancock’s corps and expected him to raid the Weldon Railroad. The trains were bearing their infantry to the defense of the Weldon Railroad. The infantry that McIntosh had discovered were part of this force. Meade feared that once Lee discovered that Hancock was not raiding the railroad and was absent from the Petersburg front, Lee would attack his left and rear. (Meade to Grant 11:50 a.,m. July 27, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Part 3, p. 503.

Meade had left the left flank of the V Corps wide open when he pulled Ferrero’s 4th division out of the intrenchments connecting the Jerusalem Plank Road to the Norfolk Road. If the Confederate infantry attacked up the Plank Road they would first encounter the unprotected left flank of Warren’s V Corps. Baxter’s brigade

Humphreys informed Burnside of the news and ordered him to take two of his brigades to occupy the intrenchments from the Plank Road to the Norfolk Road and to picket the line from which Hancock’s pickets had been withdrawn. Humphreys ordered the two brigades to report to Warren as well as Meade’s headquarters.. . (Humphreys to Burnside 10:15 a,.m,. July 27, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Part 3, p. 526. .

Humphreys then notified Warren of these events. Humphreys to Warren . (Humphreys to Warren 10:15 a,.m,. July 27, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Part 3, p. 519. .Warren replied to Humphreys’ communication of 8 p.m. the previous evening. He echoed what Meade had told Grant the day before, that
He said that careful study of his position led him to conclude that “I cannot well abandon any part of my line without giving up all of it.

At 11:50 am. Meade telegraphed Grant on McIntosh’s discovery and that he anticipated an attack on his left and rear. Meade to Grant 11:50 a.m. July 27, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Part 3, p. 503.

Grant’s reading of the situation was more accurate than Meade’s. Ord (commanding XVIII Corps) had reported to him that the trains were running from Petersburg to Richmond. Grant told Meade this and and shared his conclusion that “I think we can rely on the place being left tolerably bare.” (Grant to Meade 12:30 p.m. July 27, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Part 3, p. 503.

As if on cue McIntosh reported a few minutes later that he had sent Lt. Col. Bacon to find out what had happened. Bacon learned that 24 cavalry had Fired on the morning patrol as they advanced. (McIntosh to Humphreys, July 27, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Part 3, p. 533)

It is likely that the patrol from the 5th New York Cavalry had misreported what they found because they had just been assigned to the area and were nervous about the unfamiliar terrain.

Lonstreet’s famous remark about another general who was “as tender about his flanks as a virgin” certainly applies to Meade in this case and in other cases as well.

Although less of a physical danger, there was another kind of excitement as well.

In the late morning and early afternoon of July 28th Grant and Meade continued planning of the timing on the assault and who should play a part in it or even if the assault should take place at all!. At 11:30 a.m. Grant proposed bringing Hancock back on that night. However, he continued, Hancock would be too tired to participate in the attack. He could, however, take the place of the XVIII Corps in the trenches. Grant queried, “Do you think the necessary preparations can be made for an assault in the morning?” Grant to Meade 11:30 a.m. July 28, 1864 OR Vol 40, Part 3, p. 553)

Meade replied that if Hancock started a return trip that night, he could not arrive until after daylight. He could be placed in rear of the IX Corps and spend the day resting. During the day Meade and Grant could decide who should make the assault – the II Corps, the IX Corps or the XVIII Corps. The assault might be made tomorrow evening (July 29th) Meade to Grant 12 Noon July 28, 1864 OR Vol 40, Part 3, p. 553)

In his next telegram Grant thought that unless something new turned up north of the James, Meade could withdraw Hancock and Sheridan that night and make arrangmeents for the assault as soon as possible. “We can determine by the movements of the enemy before the time comes whether it will be advisable to go on with the assault.” He left it up to Meade whether to use the XVIII Corps. (Grant to Meade 12:30 p.m. July 28, 1864 OR Vol 40, Part 3, p. 553)

Meade concluded the exchange by saying that daylight of July 30th was the earliest time he advised making the assault. This was necessary because he had to bring up the heavy guns and mortars to supporet the attack, remove abates in front of the Union lines, and so on. He announced he would make the assault with the IX Corps supported by the II Corps. The XVIII should be held in readiness and if developments justified it, all of Ord’s and Warren’s men could be committed. Meade to Grant 1 p.m. July 28, 1864 OR Vol 40, Part 3, p. 553-554)