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Day By Day Hist. of Siege of Petersburg July 64 3

July 12, 1864

At dawn Lyman sent a detail of 50 men to prepare the ground for Meade’s relocated headquarters. At 8 a.m. the headquarters wagons set out for the new site. (At Meade’s headquarters p. 189)

Meade wrote to his wife, “This is a bold stroke of Lee’s to endeavor to procure the withdrawal of this army from its menacing attitude, and to prevent the sending of reinforcements to Grant. The maneuver thus far has been successful, as not only has the Sixth Corps been sent away, but the Nineteenth Corps (twenty thousand strong), which was sent to reinforce us, has been diverted to Washington. This loss of strength will practically prevent our doing anything in the way of offensive movements until the campaign in Maryland is settled and the rebels so crippled as to quiet all apprehension of their return [to the north].” Life and Letters of General Meade p. 211

Skirmishes at Proctor’s Farm

(Footnote: for the name of the fight, see Ceremonies at Dedication of Monument of the Eighth Penna. Cavalry Regiment p. 19)

Marching through the night the command reached the left of the army about 5 a.m. and moved down the plank road. Davies’ 1st brigade moved out to Ream’s Station, accompanied by one regiment from Gregg’s brigade. Gregg’s 2nd brigade remained with the division commander in reserve. Report of Gregg OR Vol. 40, Part 1, p. 614.

Davies encountered pickets from Fitz Lee’s cavalry division and forced them back into their intrenchments one mile east of Ream’s Station. There was a house on the skirmish line. As Col. Kester of the 1st New Jersey Cavalry and his staff walked around the outside of the house, one of the troopers came out of the house informed the adjutant that there was a curious spectacle inside. The adjutant found the wall lined with all the feather beds and mattresses in the house in a vain effort to keep out stray bullets. Lying prone on the floor were 15 women ranging in age from a girl of 13 to a woman of 84. Every time a bullet struck the house they drummed their heels on the floor in a frenzy of terror. (Ride to War p. 280)

Davies remained in position until late in the afternoon when Gen. Gregg ordered him to rejoin the main force. . Report of Gregg OR Vol. 40, Part 1, p. 614. According to Gen. Gregg, Davies, lost no officers or men missing in the skirmishing. He does not state the number of killed or wounded Davies lost.

An enlisted man in the 1st Pennsylvania Cavalry puts his regiment’s loss at 1 killed and 1 seriously or mortally wounded. (I Seat Myself to Write You a Few Lines p. 233.The 1st New Jersey Cavalry lost 2 or 3 wounded. (Ride to War by Pyne p. 279)

Meanwhile Gregg’s 2nd Brigade arrived at the Jerusalem Plank Road at 10 a.m. with the 16th Pennsylvania Cavalry in the lead. Upon arriving the regiment and perhaps the entire brigade ate breakfast. After noon Gen. Gregg sent two regiments (the 2nd and 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry) under Lt. Col. Joseph P. Brinton of the 2nd Pennsylvania Cavalry from Gregg’s 2nd Brigade down the Plank Road to scout around Proctor’s farm. For the time that Gregg arrived, the eating of breakfast and for the time Gregg sent the two regiments see The Cormany Diaries p. 458. For the identity of the two regiments. Report of Gregg OR Vol. 40, Part 1, p. 614. Itinerary of 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry OR Vol. 40, Part 1, p. 205. By coincidence Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee made a reconnaissance toward Lee’s Mill with a detachment from Wickham’s and Lomax’s brigades.

Brinton and his two regiments crossed Warwick Swamp at the bridge. A short distance beyond they encountered a barricade. According to one account the 2nd Pennsylvania Cavalry dismounted and went forward on foot. (Bryant to OR Vol. 40, Part 3, p. ) Fitz Lee himself happened to be going around the same barricade and barely escaped capture. (Diary of Maj. James D. Ferguson in Supplement to Official Records Vol. 7, p. 343. Report of Gregg OR Vol. 40, Part 1, p. 614.

Two hundred yards beyond the barricade Capt. John O. Lashley, commanding a squadron of cavalry, charged Brinton’s advance Dismounted Confederates in the woods on either side of the road supported the charge. Brinton fell back 700 yards to the bridge where he held his ground.

In the afternoon Barlow joined Gregg at the road intersection with his 1st Division. He had left his position near the Williams house at 5:15 a.m. and had marched four miles west down the Jerusalem Plank road to the cross roads. His role was to hold the intersection while Gregg employed his entire cavalry force against Fitz Lee’s cavalry. Report of Gregg OR Vol. 40, Part 1, p. 614. Apparently Gregg had been placed under Hancock’s orders though Hancock did not accompany the column and was probably still at the Williams house. (Mitchell’s Memoranda report OR Vol. 40, Pt. 1 p. 320)

When Davies returned from Ream’s Station and joined Gen. Gregg, the division advanced to Proector’s farm pushing back the dismounted Confederates in his front. Gregg claimed they retired to Ream’s Station. Report of Gregg OR Vol. 40, Part 1, p. 614.

The fight near Lee’s Mill was a clear cut victory for the Confederates. They captured Maj. Joseph Steele, 2 lieutenants and 29 men of the 2nd Pennsylvania Cavalry with their horses and arms. The regiment also lost 10 wounded. Itinerary of 2nd Pennsylvania Cavalry OR Vol. 40, Part 1, p 204. The 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry said its loss was “light.” Itinerary of 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry OR Vol. 40, Part 1, p. 205. In his report Gen. Gregg put Brinton’s loss at 3 officers missing, 12 men wounded and 28 men missing. Report of Gregg OR Vol. 40, Part 1, p. 614.

A squadron of the 2nd Virginia Cavalry under Capt. John O. Lashley. (report of Fitzhugh Lee in Supplement to Official Records Vol. 7, p. 333. moved out on the plank road where it met the enemy. Gregg’s report OR Vol. 40, Pt. 1, p. 202.

According to Dyer, Gregg’s command lost 3 killed, 13 wounded, 30 missing for a total of 46. Frederick Dyer, Compendium of the War of the Rebellion, New York: Thomas Yoseloff 1959, p. 947.

According to Capt. Lasley, his squadron consisted of Companies D and K and his loss was limited to one horse. He had been promoted to captain only a day or two before and had already proven his ability. (Robert J. Driver, Jr Second Virginia Cavalry p. 131.

After the skirmish at Lee’s Mill, Barlow withdrew to the Williams house.

At 9:45 p.m. Hancock was ordered to form in reserve behind the V Corps. The corps took position on the right and left of the Norfolk road near the Deserted house and also near the Southall house. (Mitchell’s Memoranda report OR Vol. 40, Pt. 1 p. 320)

At 8 p.m. Hancock informed Meade that Gen. Smyth who commanded the old picket line of II Corps had noticed a force of one or two brigades striking tents and moving from his front an hour previous. Hancock to Meade 8 p.m. July 12, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 1, p. 185)

Meade concluded that the Confederates Smyth reported leaving Petersburg was what he expected. He concluded that Hancock would not be able to dislodge the Confederates without employing his entire corps, and even then he might fail if the Confederates detached enough men from Petersburg.

July 13, 1864

Gibbon’s 2nd Divison moved to the right, north of the Jerusalem Plank Road and took position near the Southall house. The division’s left rested on the Norfolk Railroad. Dow’s 6th Maine Battery occupied the redoubt at the center of the line. Edgell’s 1st New Hampshire Battery took position in the redoubt on the Norfolk road. Two batteries were assigned to each of the other two divisions as well. The remainder of the II Corp’s artillery brigade massed north of the Jerusalem Plank Road near the Williams house. (Report of Maj. John G. Hazard OR Vol. 40, Part 1, p. 425)

On the 13th Gregg’s division marched to warwick swamp, took position and Lee’s Mill, and established a picket line near the Jerusalem Plank Road. . Gregg’s report OR Vol. 40, Pt. 1, p. 202.

July 14, 1864

On the 14th Grant learned that there was no chance of getting more horses for the cavalry for two weeks. Rather than wait he determined to send Sheridan and Kautz on the earliest practicable day, with infantry supporting them would accompany him only beyond the reach of the rebel infantry. U.S. Grant to Maj. Gen. Meade July 14, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, p. 924. Meade passed the information along to Sheridan and queried how many men he had. Sheridan replied that he had 9,000 and how far his infantry supports would go with him. Maj. Gen. Geo. G. Meade to Lt. Gen. Grant OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, p. 925

On the 14th the confederates made a slight demonstration on ream’s station road near proctor’s store. Gregg’s report OR Vol. 40, Pt. 1, p. 202.

July 15, 1864

On July 15th Meade informed Grant that Sheridan wished the infantry to accompany him on the entire raid, fearing that the enemy would obstruct his return. Meade said he himself believed this was the safest course. He asked Grant if he felt he could spare the II Corps for the time such a raid would take, say ten days . Maj. Gen. Geo. G. Meade to Lt. Gen. Grant 6 p.m. July 15, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, pp. 255-256. Having been told by Comstock that the Confederates had left Maryland and that the VI and XIX were on their way back to Petersburg Grant decided to cancel the cavalry raid in favor of sending these infantry instead. Lt. Gen. U.S. Grant to Maj. Gen. Meade 8 p.m. July 15, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, p. 256.

Meanwhile on July 14th Grant wrote a telegram to Halleck and entrusted it to Comstock. In the commuication grant stated that, since the rebels were leaving Maryland, he wished Hunter to follow them and march to Gordonsville and Charlottesville tearing up the railroad. “The Sicth and Nineteenh corps should be got here wtihout delay , so that they may be used before the return of the troops sent into the Valley by the enemy.” Lt. Gen. U.S. Grant to Maj. Gen. Halleck July 14, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, p. 223.

Also on the 14th Grant informed Hancock that if all the commanders around Washington and Baltimore pushed out boldly the enemy could be driven from Maryland with great loss.or destroyed. Grant assured Halleck, “If I find further detachments have been sent from here I will make a determined push to obtain a firm foothold that will ultimately secure Richmond and be easily held, and detach all I can. Lt. Gen. Grant to Maj. Gen. Halleck 2 p..m. July 14, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3 p. 223.

An hour later Grant told Halleck he’d received a telegram from Dana, who had said the enemy was leaving Maryland. If so, Grant directed Halleck, instructions should be sent to Fort Monroe to direct the rest of the XIX Corps to Petersburg instead of Washington. Lt. Gen. U.S. Grant to Maj. Gen. Halleck 3 p.m. July 14, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3 p. 224

On the night of the 15th Comstock informed Grant that Halleck did not regard Comstock’s request for the VI and XIX Corps as an order and wished Grant to send him a direct order. Halleck thought that the enemy would return to Maryland as soon as Wright left. Comstock told Grant it would take Wright three or four days to get back to Petersburg. Lt. Col. C.B. Comstock to Lt. Gen. U.S. Grant 10:30 p.m. July 15, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3 p. 253

July 16, 1864

On the afternoon of the 16th Grant told Halleck that he wanted to get the VI and XIX Corps back before Early rejoined Lee’s army. Hunter in the Valley could check any future invasion until reinforcements from Petersburg reached Washington. Grant predicted, “I do not think there is now any further danger of an attempt to invade Maryland.” Lt. Gen. U.S. Grant to Maj. Gen. Halleck 4:40 p.m. July 16, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, pp. 275-276.

Also on the 16th Meade informed Grant that batteries were being erected to silence the Confederate guns at the salient on the Jerusalem Plank Road. He also told Grant that Hunt estimated that it would take three days to “remove the siege guns and materials in case a sudden withdrawal of the army should become necessary after the siege operations have been entered upon.”Maj. Gen. Geo. G. Meade to Lt. Gen. Grant 10 p.m. July 16, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, p. 276.

Grant informed Halleck that if Early headed north again he would not enter Maryland, but would come instead through West Virginia to Ohio. He recommended that Pennsylvania and ought to organize their citizens to prepare for such an occurrence. He informed Halleck that he would order to Washington all regiments whose term of service expired before the 20th of August. This would give a nuceus to new troops raised and sent to the capital. Lt. Gen. U.S. Grant to Maj. Gen. Halleck 1 p.m. July 17, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3 p. 289.

On July 16th the 6th New York was ordered to relieve Gregg’s division which was picketing the left of the army. The command set out at 6 am and relieved colonel bryan’s provisional brigade and gregg’s 2nd division. The 6th ny went out on picket. Devin’s report OR vol. 43, Pt. 1, p. 470 and History of the Sixth New York Cavalry, p. 205

July 17, 1864

on the 17th Helleck informed Grant that according to Hunter his 12,000 men were not more than one-third of the number needed to protect the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. He had, Halleck said, trasmitted Grant’s instructions to Wright ordering the return of the VI and XIX Corps.
OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3 p. 289.

Also on the 17th Lincoln contacted Grant. Quoting a communication from Grant to Sherman in which Grant said, “I shall make a desperate effort to get a position here which will hold the enemy without the necessity of so many men”, Lincoln applauded the idea, but said, ‘I do hope you may find a way that the effort shall not be desperate in the sense of a great loss of life.”
OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3 p. 289.

July 18, 1864

On July 18th deserters and refugees reported a rebel movement on the left. The 6th New York Cavalry prepared for action at 6 a.m. the rebels charged the picket line and drove in the line on the right, but the feds retook the line. At 8 p.m. chapman’s brigade relieved them. Devin’s report OR vol. 43, Pt. 1, p. 470 and History of the Sixth New York Cavalry, p. 205

Halleck made several important points that Grant probably did not want to hear. First, As long as Grant’s army was south of the James it would take a week or ten days before he learnd the rebels had sent a large detachment against Washingt, West Virginia, Maryland and Pennvylsania and

Second, Hunter’s army was too weak to simultaneously guard the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, hold West Virginia, and resist any large rebel raid into the north.

Third, the militia of the North could not be relied upon to guard against these raids. They’d either arrive too late, not come out at all, or would come in so small a force as to be useless.

Fourth, the garrisons of the cities of Baltimore and Washington were made up of troops unfit for the field. If the VI Corps had not arrived both cities would have been in grave danger. A larger force should be left near those two cities. He pointed out that the cities had been safe as long as Grant remained between Lee and Washington, Maryland and Pennsylvania. He had sent Grant all the troops available from Washington and the North who could take the field.

Anticipating the argument that troops could always be counted on to arrive in time to protect Washington and Baltimore, Halleck pointed out that if the VI Corps had arrived 24 hours later Baltimore and Washington would have been dinager. The cities would not be safe without a large available force. He asked pointedly, “Is not Washington too important in a political as well as a military point of view to run any serious risk at all?” Maj. Gen. H.W. Halleck to Lt. Gen. Grant July 19, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, p. 333.

July 20, 1864

On july 20 the reserve of the 6th New York Cavalry was called out to repel another attack on the picket line. The regiment was relieved at 7 a.m. and marched to Light House. History of the Sixth New York Cavalry, p. 205

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