July 6, 1864 Wednesday

On July 6th Grant told Meade that his engineer officers shared Meade’s view that an attack on Lee’s fortifications could not succeed. He informed Meade that, “The best we can do now is to strengthen our present line on Burnside’s and Warren’s and advance by gradual approaches as you propose.” Once the cavalry had recovered he would launch a raid, supporting the cavalry with infantry as far as the Weldon Railroad Lt. Gen. U.S. Grant to Major General Meade July 5, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, p. 5.

On July 6th Duane and Hunt issued a report to Meade in which they stated an assault was not practical and recommended regular approaches to Elliott’s salient. He forwarded the report to Grant the following day.

July 7, 1864 Thursday

In his cover letter Meade pointed out to Grant that a Confederate fort on the rebel salient on the Jerusalem Plank Road would take in reverse any troops advancing after the mine exploded
Therefore it was necessary to use siege techniques to capture that salient before the mine could be exploded. He warned Grant that even after the fort was taken several lines needed to be seized before the Federals could cross the Appomattox and attack Swift Creek on Bermuda Hundred. He told Grant these operations could be slow and tedious. Maj. Gen. Geo. G. Meade to Lt. Gen. U.S. Grant July 7, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, p. 61.

Grant countered by telling Meade that according to Chief Engineer Barnard the salient could be taken by an assault and that regular approaches were not necessary. Lt. Gen. U.S. Grant to Maj. Gen. Meade 11 p.m. July 7, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, p. 62

July 8, 1864 Friday

The following day Grant sent Meade a follow-up telegram telling him that he was sending Col. Cyrus Comstock to talk to Meade about his plans. He poured out his thoughts, in a sort of automatic writing as various plans occurred to him

Grant began by telling Meade, “If the approaches are made it will be with the view of ultimately making an assault on the enemy’s lines. . . “

However, he said, “. . . I have always hoped to go through in Butler’s front so as to carry the north bank of Swift Creek.” This could not be done until the XIX Corps arrived, he added,– “without giving up too much ground that we have already fought for.”

Grant concluded by mentioning another project: “We ought by all means to cut the Weldon road so as to make it useless to the enemy.” He proposed removing the II Corps from its position so it could go with the cavalry. The VI Corps could take the place of the II Corps. “Preparations for this, I think, should be made at once so as to start from your left by the night of the 10th. Lt. Gen. U.S. Grant to Maj. Gen. George G. Meade 11:30 a.m. July 8, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, pp. 72-73.

From the exchange it was clear that Meade believed the salient on the road had to be dealt with, otherwise the forts would deliver gunfire that would doom Burnside’s attack.

July 9, 1864 Saturday

On July 9th Meade announced the commencement of the Siege of Petersburg. (Asst. Adj. Gen. Seth Williams, Circular, July 9, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Part 1, p. 286)

July 9th was a crucial day. At 11 a.m. Meade informed Grant that before sending the II Corps and the cavalry on a raid down the Weldon Railroad, he wished to complete a line of redoubts necessary to protect his left flank after the II Corps departed on the raid. He estimated the work would be done by the 13th. He assured Grant that the delay would be beneficial because it would give Sheridan’s cavalry more time to recover from their Trevelian Station Raid. He quoted a communication from Sheridan saying, “My command is recruiting rapidly, but it is not fit for hard work yet.. . . “ Maj. Gen. Geo. G. Meade to Lt. Gen. Grant 11 p.m. July 9, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, p. 94.

A bit later Grant received a communication from Gen. Canby stating that he would send Grant 20,000 men belonging to the XIX Corps. The first division, Canby believed, would arrive at Fort Monroe on the 8th or 9th of July, to be followed as rapidly as possible by the balance of the men when vessels to transport them became available In light of this information Grant told Meade to delay the raid until these reinforcements arrived. Lt. Gen. U.S. Grant to Maj. Gen. Meade July 9, 1864 in OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, p. 94..

At 1 p.m. Halleck destroyed all Grant’s plans by asking Grant if he could forward the XIX Corps to Washington D.C. Maj. Gen. H.W. Halleck to Lt. Gen. Grant 1 p.m. July 9, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, p. 91. In his reply Grant gave Halleck permission to order the XIX Corps to Washington. He said, “About the 18th or 20th is the time I should like to have a large force here; but if the rebel force now north can be captured or destroyed I would willingly postpone aggressive operations to destroy them. . . “Grant ended by offering the VI Corps as well. Lt. Gen. U.S. Grant to Maj. Gen. Halleck July 9, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, p. 92.

That evening Grant ordered Meade to send the balance of the VI Corps to Washington, D.C. He told Meade his goal was to destroy the Confederates north of the Potomac. Lt. Gen. U.S. Grant to Maj. Gen. Meade July 9, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, p. 95.

At 8:45 p.m. Humphreys ordered Wright to move his corps at once to City Point, to embark for Washington, D.C. and to report to Maj. Gen. Halleck upon arrival. (Humphreys to Wright 8:45 p.m. July 9, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, p. 106.

Also at 8:45 p.m. Humphreys informed Hancock that Wright was leaving that night for City Point and ordered Hancock to relieve his pickets. He directed Hancock to occupy the same positions he had held while Wright was at the Weldon Railroad. . He told Hancock that Ferrero would report to Hancock at the Williams house and that Col. Bryans’ cavalry would also report to him Humphreys to Hancock 8:45 p.m. July 9, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, p. 100.

Hancock protested to Gen. Sol. Williams of Meade’s staff that he did not have enough men to relieve the pickets and take up a new line because many of his men were on fatigue duty. Hancock to Gen. S. Williams. July 9, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, p. 100.

Williams informed Hancock that could use some of his men for the fatigue duty that the II Corps was presently carrying out

In the new II Corps line Gibbon occupied the right, Birney’s 3rd Division the center, and Barlow’s 1st Division was on the left. Circular July 9, 1864 Asst. Adj. Gen. Francis A. Walker OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3 p. 103. With the arrival of his reserves and Ferrero’s division, Hancock extended his lines to the left and nearly touched the Jerusalem Plank Road. Hancock to Williams 8:50 a.m. July 10, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, p. 131.

July 10, 1864 Sunday

On July 10th Kershaw’s division – which Lee held in reserve - marched down the Weldon railroad to escort a supply of corn to Petersburg.

July 11, 1864 Monday

The departure of the VI Corps made it necessary to move Meade’s headquarters from the vicinity of the Jones house into what would become the new and retracted lines. Lyman spent part of the day wandering among the swamps, burnt woods, and dusty plains. Finally he found a pine ridge located one mile northeast of the Shind house. He chose this at the new site and left a guard there.

In his diary he said what apparently could not be said in official correspondence.

“As the advance of the 6th Corps makes a return of our line necessary. . . “ (Meade’s headquarters p. 231)

At 11:40 p.m. on the night of the 10th Grant telegraphed Meade, saying that since Lee had not replied to his communications on July 8th, he thought it possible that the Confederate chieftain had left Petersburg for the Valley along with considerable reinforcements. Grant wished to find out if the rebels occupied their positions on his left in full force. This might be done either by “swinging around” a force of Hancock’s skirmishers to drive in the enemy pickdts or by sending Sheridan with 3,000 cavalry towards the Weldon Railroad. (Grant to Meade 11:40 p.m. July 11, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, p.124.

Meade informed Grant that deserters reported no movement of Confederates had occurred, that they all agreed that Hill’s, Longstreet’s and Beauregard’s troops were still at Petersburg. he saw no advantage of swinging around Hancock’s men since they would merely confront the enemy in his works. He said the reconnaissance toward the railroad could be made with Sheridan’s cavalry backed by infantry

At 1:30 a.m. Grant replied to Meade’s communication of midnight. He said that Meade’s information seemed to “qui9et all apprehension” that Lee or a portion of his army had left Petersburg and therefore made it unnecessary to make a demonstration Grant said he would prefer “being quiet” until they made a “real move”.. Grant went on to (Grant to Meade 1:30 a.m. July 11, 1864 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, p.144) This last bit of information seemed to settle beyond all doubt that all of Lee’s army was at Petersburg.

However, some time before noon a deserter from the 8th Alabama Infantry entered the lines of Col. Bryan’s provisional cavalry brigade. The deserter reported that his brigade commander had sent him to Petersburg the previous to purchase supplies and that when he returned at 8 p.m. Mahone’s division was gone. Citizens told him that Hill’s corps and McIntosh’s Artillery Battalion had left Petersburg at 5 p.m. They said Hill had left for Pennsylvania, but he believed the Confederates had marched toward the Weldon Railroad. Meade to Grant 12 p.m. July 11, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, pp. 124-125.

Meade forwarded the report to Grant and told him that he had received a report from another deserter earlier that morning (at 10:30 am.) and that the deserter from the 8th Alabama confirmed that information. Meade told Grant that there appeared to be no doubt that either part of Hill’s Corps or the entire corps had left Petersburg, but nothing indicated where it had gone. He thought the withdrawal of the VI Corps might have prompted Hill to move on the Union left flank. He told Grant that he had ordered the cavalry on the left – (Bryan’s provisional brigade) to push out in all directions. Meade to Grant 12 noon July 11, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, p. 146.

Grant telegraphed Butler and asked him if he had any recent information on Wilcox’s division. Grant to Butler July 11, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, p. 168.
Butler replied that two of Wilcox’s brigades were on Bermuda Hundred and two were opposite Deep Bottom. As for Lee, Butler replied mysterious, “Some say he is at Petersburg and some at Richmond. I am inclined to think he is at not at either place.” Butler to Grant 12:15 p.m. July 11, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, p. 168.

An hour and a half later Meade communicated to Grant the details of his interviewed the deserter from the 8th Alabama The deserter had lerft his division at 7 a.m. and returned at 7 p.m. He heard that his division had traveled down the Weldon Railroad. He also heard that Heth’s division had left at the same time. He also heard a report that the corps had left for Pennsylvania. He followed the presumed course of Mahone’s division three or four miles down the railroad where he entered Union lines. Meade added that the signal officer at the Jordan house reported that two trains of Confederates had departed Richmond for Petersburg at 4 a.m. Meade told Grant, “I think there is no doubt that Hill has moved, but in what direction is uncertain. It may be on our left flank or it may be to join Early.” Meade to Grant 1:30 p.m. uly 11, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, p. 147.

Grant replied saying that if the cavalry on hand could not penetrate the Confederate screen along the railroad that day, Meade ought to push out a division of Sheridan’s cavalry the following day to learn whether Hill had left Petersburg. If he had gone, Grant thought the army should try to capture Petersburg. He thought that the II and V Corps and Sheridan’s cavalry ought to turn the Confederate right, while Smith and Burnside concentrated on the front of one of their two corps.

Based on this small amount of information Meade concluded Hill had left Petersburg

At 2:15 p.m. Humphreys ordered Sheridan to send a division to the Jerusalem plank road where it would halt. The division commander would then report to army of the Potomac headquarters for instructions. Humphreys to Sheridan 2:15 p.m. July 11, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, p. 166. Sheridan selected Gregg’s 2nd division for the job and at 4:45 p.m. ordered it to move at once. Forsyth to Gregg p. 167.

Grant decided that if the Federals discovered that Hill’s corps had left the Petersburg lines, Hancock and Warren would “make a detour to the left and endeavor to take Petersburg by assault from the west” while Smith’s two corps from the Army of the James and Burnside’s IX Corps would “make a joint heavy assault at one point, say near the Hare house.” (Maj. Gen. A.A. Humphreys to Burnside July 11, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt, 3, p. 165.

The plan was for Hancock to leave pickets in front of his present line and to connect them with Crawford’s divison’s pickets. Humphreys to Warren p. 162. Warren would occupy the two new redoubts on the Jerusalem Plank Road. Ferrero would occupy the line between the two redcoubts to the Norfolk Railroad. (Humphreys to Warren OR Vol. 40, Pt, 3, p. 162

Warren decided to put part of Crawford’s division in the two redoubts. One brigade would hold the large redoubt and protect the artillery batteries near it on the Plank Road. Crawford was also to occupy the redoubt near his headquarters with troops. Finally, part of his picket line would connect with Griffin’s left to hold the rest of the Plank Road.

Warren in turn communication to Griffin and Crawford. He ordered Griffin to reinforce his left on the Jerusalem Plank Road so that the road could be held with his men and with Crawford’s pickets. (Locke to Graiffin and Crawford 9:30 p.m. July 11, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Part 3, p. 163

Crawford that he should be prepared to occupy the two new redoubts since Hancock might be required elsewhere. Locke to Crawford July 11, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Part 3, p. 164.

Chief of Staff Humphreys informed Burnside of this development and asked him to determine how his left should be refused if the plan were adopted. Humphreys also informed Burnside that Ferrero would be returned to him if the plan was adopted. (Maj. Gen. A.A. Humphreys to Burnside July 11, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt, 3, p. 165.

At 2:15 p.m. Humhreys ordered Sheridan to send to the Jerusalem Plank Road a division of cavalry and artillery. The division commander would report to Meade’s headquarters for instructions.Humphreys to Sheridan 2:15 p.m. July 11, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt, 3, p.166.

Humphreys sent his telegram to City Point where Quartermaster General Rufus Intalls received it. Ingalls relayed it to Sheridan’s headquarters at Light House Point. Ingalls informed Humphreys of this fact and notified him that the order should reach Sheridan about 3:30 pm At 4:15 Sheridan’s staff officer ordered Gregg to leave at once with three days rations and two days of forage. (Forsyth to Gregg 4:15 p.m. July 11, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt, 3, p.167.

Gregg’s 2nd cavalry division set out at dusk from its camp at Light House Point. (Cormany Diaries p. 458)

Hancock’s II Corps spent most of the night leveling their trenches. At 3 a.m. they started towards the Williams house. Gibbon’s 2nd Division withdrew along the breastworks. Barlow’s 1st Division withdrew either along the breastworks or along a road to the Williams house. Birney’s 3rd Division withdrew along the Jones house road. The command massed in a field near the Williams house north of the Jerusalem Plank Road. (Circular, July 11, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, p. 159)