July 1

At 2 a.m. Kershaw’s division set out for the intersection of the Weldon Railroad and the Confederate trenches to support Hill who was to attack Sheridan’s cavalry and the VI Corps at Ream’s Station. Diary of First Corps, Army of Northern Virginia OR Vol. 40 Part 1, p. 761

On the night of July 1st Meade ordered the VI Corps to resume its former position. This involved relieving Ferrero’s division. Ferrero’s division would then move to the Norfolk (Baxter) Road where it crossed Blackwater Swamp. Sheridan would move back to Prince George Court House after leaving a brigade to guard the army’s left. Meade to Grant 10 p.m. July 1, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Part 2, p. 561.

The shifting of the VI Corps to its new position would place it on the Jerusalem Plank Road about three miles from the Williams House. It would be on the left of the II Corps and on the far left of the army. Capt. W.P. Wilson, Acting Asst. Adj. Gen. II Corps, Circular July 1, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Part 2, p. 561.

The plan was for the VI Corps to occupy part of the line held by Gibbon’s division which formed the left of the II corps. Gibbon would then shift northward and occupy part of Barlow’s division. It was hoped that both Barlow and Gibbon would be enabled to put a brigade apiece into reserve. (Asst. Adj. Gen. F.A. Walker Circular July 1, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Part 2, p. 569) Birney’s division would not be effected and would continue remain in its trenches on the left of V Corps. Itinerary of Third Division, II Corps OR Vol. 40, Part 1 p. 183.

In his new position Ferrero’s pickets would form on the left of the VI Corps picket line near Sturdivant’s Mills and extend towards Prince George Court House. (Humphreys to Ferrero 10:30 p.m. July 1, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Part 2, p. 573.

Sheridan’s cavalry brigade was to picket between the Gurley house and Ream’s Station. (Humphreys to Wright 10:30 p.m. July 1, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Part 2, p. 571.

July 2, 1864 Saturday

The II and VI Corps pulled back east of the Jerusalem Plank Road and formed their line so that it prolonged the main Union line already formed by the XVIII Corps, the X Corps, the IX Corps, and the V Corps. The VI Corps occupied the ground near the Williams house. Itinerary of Third Division VI Corps. P. 193.

(Mitchell Memoranda p. 319, Itinerary of VI Corps p. 192.

July 3, 1864 Sunday

In the morning Grant asked Meade if he thought Warren could break through the Confederates in his front if he launched a bold and decisive attack. If so roads would have to be built to bring troops up rapidly, batteries constructed to bring the greatest number of guns to bear on the points of attack, the the breastworks to the north strengthened so they could be held with the minimum number of troops. In any event Grant wished to postpone the attack until the cavalry was rested and until rain settled the dust. If Meade believed the attack could not succeed, Grant proposed givi9ng Meade an army sufficient to meet Lee and to march around Petersburg and come in from above. If this course were adopted, he thought it could not be done before the arrival of the XIX Corps. (Grant to Meade 10:30 a.m. July 3, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Part 2, p. 599.

Meade replied that he would need to talk to Burnside and Warren. His impression was that Warren did not believe an attack could succeed on his front and that Burnside some days before had said he believed he could break through the rebels in his front. .

July 3, 1864 Sunday

Therefore it must have been a severe shock to Meade when on the morning of July 3rd Grant asked him, “Do you think it possible, by a bold and decisive attack, to break through the enemy's center, say in General Warren's front somewhere?” Grant concluded by saying that he would not mount any attack until the cavalry was rested and the XIX Corps had joined them. Lt. Gen. Grant to Maj. Gen. George G. Meade 10:30 a.m. July 3, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, p. 599

At noon a nonplused Meade telegraphed Grant that before replying he would need to speak to Warren and Burnside. He went on to say that he was under the impression that Warren did not believe an attack in the V Corps’ front could succeed but that Burnside felt an assault could succeed in front of the IX Corps. Maj. Gen. George G. Meade to Lt. Gen. Grant 12 noon July 3, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, p. 599.

In his effort to persuade Grant that the attack would fail, Meade ordered an examination of Burnside’s and Warren’s fronts by his colleagues and friends, Duane and Henry J. Hunt, who felt as he did. He also queried Warren and Burnside whether an assault in each general’s front could succeed if the troops then on his flanks - the VI and II Corps participated as well. Maj. Gen. Geo. G. Meade to Major General Burnside 12 noon July 3, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, p. 608.

Burnside replied that if the assault were delayed until the mine was ready, it had a better than even chance of success. If made without the mine the assault had a fair chance of success, especially if he could decide when and how the two additional corps could attack. Maj. Gen. A.E. Burnside to Major General Meade July 3, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3 p. 608

Always jealous of his prerogatives as Army commander, an irate Meade replied that he would receive gladly from Burnside any suggestions about the attack by the other two corps but that the decision on how to employ them was his to make since he commanded the army. Maj. Gen. Geo. G. Meade to Major General Burnside July 3, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Pt. 3, p. 608.

July 4, 1864 Monday

At noon on July 4th Meade replied to Grant’s query: “After examination and conference with corps commanders I am satisfied an immediate assault on the enemy's line in my front is impracticable. The enemy now occupies the line held by him on the 18th ultimo, which I vainly endeavored to dislodge him from. Not having succeeded then, when he had only occupied this line some twelve hours, I cannot expect to do it now that he has been two weeks strengthening and adding to it.” However, if Grant wished to employ Burnside’s mine he would have to give up the Jerusalem Plank Road and withdraw the II and VI Corps for the attack. Maj. Gen. Geo. G. Meade to Lt. Gen. Grant 12 noon July 4, 1864 OR Vol. 41, Pt. 3, p. 619

July 5, 1864 Tuesday

Warren wrote to Meade with what seems a shocking preamble, “As a preliminary to withdrawing the two corps from my left” He went on to propose constructing two redoubts. The first redoubt would be located near Crawford’s headquarters and would be capable of holding one battery and 500 men. The second which would be along the Plank Road would hold 1500 men. Warren said that this would “enable our left flank to be held by a small force without apprehension from an assault.” (Warren to Humphreys 10:30 a.m. July 5, 1864 OR Vol. 40, Part 3, p. 9)

The comments by Warren this day seem almost prescient in that he forsaw the necessity for the II and VI Corps to withdraw from their trenches west of the main Union line.