[Headquarters, Humphrey’s Brigade]
[July 28, 1864]
[To: LGEN Richard H. Anderson]
In obedience to your orders I moved Kershaw’s. Bryan’s and Humphrey’s Brigades from the trenches on the New Market Heights and the Darbytown Road late in the evening of the 20th [probably meant to say 26th] and took possession of the River Road with little opposition, capturing 49 persons. You then instructed me to rest my right flank on Baily [sic] Run and not to leave that flank exposed – to act on the defensive, and if flanked by superior force on my left to move back to the trenches on Darbytown Road and New Market Heights. By establishing a skirmish line wherever natural obstacles present, that would break the force of a charge. I succeeded in stretching my line from Sweeney’s Pottery on Bailey Run [note that he spells it correctly in this instance] on the right to Tilghman’s Gate and constructing breastworks. Humphrey’s brigade on that flank [was protected ?] by …. [dots in copy at Archives] Gary’s cavalry, [with] Bryan in the center and Kershaw on the left.
During the day of the 26th the enemy opened their artillery on that position of the line exposed to view on both sides of Tilghman’s Gate, and got the exact range of the pickets, [who were] frequently engaged in my front. Before daylight on the 27th Col. Carter placed the Rockbridge Artillery with 4.20 [four twenty pound] parrot guns in position at Tilghman’s Gate ion pits embrazured [probably a transcription misspelling] to fire on the enemy tete du Pont and [sic, at] Deep Bottom. As soon as the fog lifted about sunrise, Col. Rutherford [3 S.C. Volunteers] discovered 2 divisions of the enemy infantry, moving to his left and informed me of it. I immediately instructed Lieutenant Colonel Hardaway to hold the artillery horses in readiness to withdraw his artillery if required. I then for the first time learned from him that his horses had been sent to the rear by your orders. I repeated to him my instructions to send for them immediately which he did. Shortly afterwards Gen. Gary informed mime by courier that my line was flanked on my left, and that a column of the enemy was moving against him, between his and my line. I at once determined to abandon my position as untenable. To save the artillery was the only difficulty. To delay the enemy until the horses could be brought up, I sent a message to Gen’l Gary to attack at once as he had the enemy in reverse, and that I would make dispositions to meet it also.
The artillery was taken from the pits and placed in the road so as to sweep the open field on my left. Two regiments, the 3rd & 15th S. C. Vol., were found in line perpendicular to the road and fronting the enemy’s flanking column, making the artillery the vortex.
The disposition, through [sic, though] the best I could do under the circumstances, was weak in as much as it exposed the right flank of the artillery and the two regiments in an enfilade from the Tete du Point [sic, Pont], and the most that could be hoped form it was to delay the enemy until the artillery horses arrived. Gen. Gary did not attack in time. When the enemy advanced, the parrot [sic] guns opened fire upon the line. This drew upon them and the two regiments the fire of the skirmish line in front and the artillery from the tete du pont, which perfectly enfiladed them.
The infantry supports gave way, followed by the artillery [men] leaving our guns in the enemy’s possession. Having no assurance that the artillery horses would be brought up to enable the artillerists to carry off the guns, I made no attempt to retake [them], but immediately gave orders for the withdrawal of all my command to the trenches at Darbytown Road and New Market Heights, which was effected without loss. The enemy pursued slowly, but continuously, and established a picket line in front of our trenches.
Late in the evening they made a feeble assault on my extreme left, but [it] was easily repulsed by Gen ____ [Gary?], commanding the 10th Regiment [apparently the 10 GA of Bryan’s Brigade] and Marystown’s legion probably Hampton’s Legion, but given the wretched work of the transcriber, it may have been Holcombe Legion, i.e., the 7 S. C. Cavalry] [We lost] 7 killed, 37 wounded, 7 missing.
Respectfully,
[No signature, Benjamin G. Humphreys]
Ben. G. [Obviously, Brigadier General
Source: [Benjamin G. Humphreys] to [Richard H. Anderson], [ca. 28 Jul 64], TS, Benjamin Grubb Humphreys Papers, Mississippi Department of Archives and History.
This is an extremely poor transcription, with no place or date given, nor the addressee. It apparently was addressed to Anderson, who was Humphreys’ superior. No explanation is given for the absence of Kershaw, who was normally in command of the division. From the context, it was not addressed to Kershaw, and should not have been addressed to Ewell. There is however, a very helpful hand-drawn map which appears with this typescript report.
Lee Sturkey wrote, "My analysis is that it does not reflect at all well upon Humphreys, who took no initiative, except possibly to advance two regiments of Henagan’s brigade to try to oppose the advancing Federals. It is just as likely that this was done by Henagan, without any orders from Humphreys. Why Humphreys’ and Gary’s pickets did not hear the Federals crossing is incomprehensible. And Humphreys essentially abandoned the artillery."
Bryce A. Suderow