p. 201 - after Bonham returned the second time, he sat down for about 15 minutes and then Brown told him to saddle Lt. Brown’s horse.

P. 202 - While Bonham saddled the horse, Gen. Brown got a cup of coffee. Sanborn was with him but Bonham did not hear what either of the generals said. Bonham and Brown left him at the camp fire when they rode off.

P. 203 - Bonham rode behind Brown at the head of the column as it commenced to move towards Big Blue river. After Brown and Bonham started, they could see Winslow’s moving column about half a mile in their front.

P. 204 - It took half an hour for Brown to move from his camp fire to where he pushed through and overlapped Winslow’s column. Winslow’s column would stop and start again repeatedly and Brown was trying to get past them all the time. They came upon Winslow himself after sunrise. Although Winslow and Brown conversed, Bonham could not her what they said.

p. 205 - When he was ordered to go up Winslow’s column to see if they were in motion. Bonham only went up half a mile. It was about 3/4 of a mile from Brown’s headquarters to where the head of Winslow’s column. On his second trip up the line Bonham observed that Winslow’s troops were not moving. About 15 minutes after Bonham saddled the horses, Brown and Bonham began riding up Winslow’s line together.

P. 206 - Col. Philips’ regiment was dismounted. Col Kelly was moving up with his regiment

p. 209 - asked if Winslow’s men were skirmishing with the rebs when Brown and Bonham joined Winslow, Bonham replied that he did not hear any firing.

P.210 - Bonham says that on the night of the 22nd at 10 or 11 Bonham and Brown met with Winslow. They remained with him half or 3/4 of an hour. Capt. Little was there too.

Testimony of Lt. James H. Brown

p. 211 - Brown thought it was 1 a.m. when he rested for the night. They met with Winslow about midnight.

p. 212 - At that time Winslow had finally halted. The troops directly in Brown’s front that night was a section of artillery. Lt. Brown went out 2 or 3 miles for forage

p. 213 - but found none. When he came back he built a fire and rested. Capt. Brown was awakened before dawn, probably by Bonham. He heard a bugle sound before they started forward.

P. 214 - As they moved to the front he saw troops which he supposed were Winslow’s. He did not see the artillery. While they were moving, Gen. Brown sent Capt. Brown to bring up the remainder of the brigade, particularly McFerran’s regiment. He did not find McFerran and reported that fact to the general. As he returned to the general, he met Little who was was going after them. As he went down the line he met Philips’ regiment moving forward and perhaps the 4th as well.

p. 215 - When he returned to Gen. Brown, Capt. Brown dismounted his escort company at what he supposed was the head of Winslow’s column. Brown thinks the 7th MSM came up ab08t the time Brown dismounted. He reached Gen. Brown around sunrise.

p. 216 - Brown heard Pleasonton say to Gen. Brown "You have disgraced your brigade sir; they are scattered for miles." Then Pleasonton said something about the orders he had given Brown. Brown replied that he had obeyed the orders amd commenced to explain. Pleasonton stopped him and said that he would hear about that afterwards. Then he said, You will go to the rear under arrest." Pleasonton asked who was the next ranking officer. Brown told him Col. Philips. Pleasonton sent for Philips and told him to take command of the brigade. Brown then reported to Maj. Kelly.

P. 217 - Immediately after Gen. Brown told Brown to report to Kelly, Brown saw Kelly and participated with him in crossing the Blue on horseback. After Brown’s relief it was only a few minutes, half an hour at most before they went into action.

P. 218 - After Pleasonton told Brown that he had disgraced his brigade, Brown replied, "I have obeyed your order general."

p. 219 - judges that they were at Winslow’s hq at midnight.

P. 221 - When Brown went back to find the 1st MSM to hurry them forward, he encountered the 7th MSM almost immediately and the 4th a little later. He never did find the 1st. His orders were to close up the 1st if he could find them.

p. 223 - before they moved, Capt. Smith ordered Brwon to get the escort ready. On his way back to find the 1st, Brown encountered Little, who asked him where he was going. Brown replied Brown said he was going back to tell them to close up. He did not find them and on his way back to Gen. Brown, he met Capt. Little again.

P. 114 - Brrown thought it was 2 miles from where Brown rested for the night and where Pleasonton releived him, but he was not sure.

Testimony of Col. John F. Philips

p. 225 - Philips estimates that he reached Indepdence at 2 p.m. His regiment was in the column’s rear, with the 4th ahead of him and the 1st in front of the 4th.

P. 226 - Philips thought that the section of Thurber’s battery was in front of the 4th MSM. He estimates he was halted at Independence for 25 minutes.

p. 227 - When the 4th MSM moved forward, Philips followed. About half a mile west of town he was directed to dismount one battalion and send it into action. He sent one battalion under Crittenden and followed up with the whole command. Philips was ordered to move to the rigth of Crittendent but before he could execute that order, he was directed to support the artillery. The rebels had 2 pieces of artillery and so had the feds and for half an hour the fire was heavy and rapid. He stated the engagement lasted 2 hours. When he arrived they were skirmishing. After the 4th and 7th arrived the fighting became general and for an hour the command the fighting was heavy.

P. 228 The riflemen were at work as fast as they could fire. From the resistance of the enemy he estiamted their strength at from 1500 to 2000 men. Brown’s brigade had 1200 men. Philips own regiments had two companies detailed away the day before. It was quite dark when Philips got to the advanced skirmishers with the led horses.

P. 229 - Winslow relieved the men of Brown’s brigade. During the afternoon engagement, Brown’s brigade drove the rebs at least a mile and from 2 or 3 positions. The first rebel position was not very strong and they did not have much difficulty in driving them back. The second position was quite formidable and the brigade had the heaviest fighting to dislodge them. It must have been about sunset when Winslow’s brigade arrived on at the front. Skirmishing was going on but it was merely their rear guard covering their retreat.

P. 230 - after that Brown’s brigade moved in rear of Winslow. They kept closed up on that brigade, Philips’ regiment being the lead brigade. In his immediate front was a section of artillery consisting of 4 guns, he thought. His regiment finally halted at 1 a.m. of the 23rd and built fires. The orders that evening were to keep closed up on Winslow’s brigade so that when they moved, he moved and when they halted he halted. After the final halt he learned it was the intention to remain there all night so he had his men build fires.

P. 231 - after they halted, Philips got an order from either Brown or a staff member that the command would be there all night and the men should sleep next to their horses. His hq were by a log. The whole command built fires on the side of the road and laid there. Brown rested about 20 steps from Philips on the other side of the road. At about daylight Brown came to Philips and told him that the brigade was to take the advance, relieving Winslow’s brigade, and the 7th MSM would take the advance. Brown told Philips that the enemy was in position on the Blue and that he should get his command ready to move immediately. The command started moving between daylight and sunrise.

P. 232 - Upon receiving Brown’s verbal order, Philips roused the men and got them mounted. He estimated that this took ten minutes. After he received his orders, the ammunition train came up and he spent ten minutes distributing ammunition. And then they moved immediately.

P. 233 - Philips moved forward in a column of fours, trying to follow Brown’s escort as best they could. His regiment had to crowd forward through troops in the road. He estimated the distance from Brown’s camp to the battlefield at 3 or 4 miles. Philips estimates the trip took 40 or 45 minutes. As Philips neared the head of the column he received a note from Brown saying "You will follow Col. Winslow’s Brigade until further orders." He got this about half a mile from the head of the column.

P. 234 - upon receiving this order Philips halted and wheeled them left into line and dismounted his men and stood their about 10 minutes. Then he received further orders to move forward. He then moved to the front. At the time Philips halted, Winslow halted as welll and wheeled to the right. When Philips received the order to move forward again, Winslow’s men were still halted. The character of the ground was part of the time farms, fields and lanes. At other points it was timber on both sides of the road with very thick brush. Asked what time he arrived at the front he said he could not say with any precision, but estimated it as 12.

P. 235 - Upon arriving at the head of the column, Philips found himself within about a mile of Big Blue River. There at the front, Winslow was there. One of his regiments, probably the 3rd Iow, was deployed as skirmishers. He was ordered to prepare to fight on foot, to move his command beyond Winslow’s brigade and to relieve Winslow’s brigade. As soon as the order was isued Pleasonton rode up, relieve Brown for cowardice, and appointed Philips to command the brigade. Philips heard the conversation between the 2 generals, but did not notice what was said.

P. 236 - He remembered Pleasonton began by saying that he had found Brown’s command straggling and in a most disgraceful condition; that his troops were disorganized and he considered his conduct scandalous; that Brown had not manifested any disposition to fight; that his troops would fight if he gave them an opportunity to fight; The language of Pleasonton was quite spirited and he spoke in an excited manner. There was much more conversation between the two, but philips could not remember the details.

Brown seemed disposed to explain to Pleasonton why he had not attacked earlier; and explain his conduct in general. Pleasonton told him he did not want to hear anything from him and ordered him under arrest and to go to the rear of the

P. 237 - Philips’ 7th MSM was dismounted when Pleasonton told Philips that he wanted him to carry the brigade and drive those people from the river. Philips told him he would in a few minutes, as soon as he organized his staff which occupied only a few minutes. Philips threw the 7th into action dismounted and threw the rest of the brigade into action still mounted. First to be engaged was the 7th under Crittenden. They moved down the road dismounted about a hundred yards and threw them to the left of the road and put them under fire.

P. 238 - Philip said that the enemy was on both sides of the creek. the force that the rebs had on the east bank didn’t amount to much, not more than a small regiment. They didn’t have much difficulty driving them across the creek. They were driven across by one regiment, the 7th MSM with the help of regiment of Winslow’s which was already down by the creek which was already engaged before the 7th arrived. The 4th MSM descended to the river mounted on their horses. Mhe effected a crossing with that regiment mounted with difficulty. The rebs had felled timber into the creek and placed 2 pieces of artillery to command the ford and they reached the bank With 20 or 25 minutes delay. The 1st MSM Cavalry were closed up on the 4th MSM and were pushed across the creek as fast as the cavalry ahead could cross. Philips’ men had to make the crossing in single file. .

p. 239 - Their supply of ammunition was exhausted in the fight at Ineepdencence. The 1st MSM was armed with Austrian rifles and their cartridge boxes held 40 rounds. The cartridge boxes of the 7th MSM held only 20 rounds. On the morning of the 23rd Philips ordered his regiment to fill their cartridge boxes and to carry 20 erxtra rounds each.

The ammunition train followed the brigade until the Little Blue was reached. It was supposed that the rebels were in force on the west bank, so all the brigade’s transporattion was halted one mile east of the Blue.

P. 240 - Asked what orders he received from Brown regarding marching, stragling, etc. Philips said that every night Brown issued the order in which the regiments would march the next morning. There were also general orders issued on the subject of stragling and keeping the column closed up.

Asked if he remembered a special order issued on the morning of the 22nd or anything else based on Pleasonton’s Order No. 2, Philips said he did not.

P. 241 - asked whether the night was light or dark, Philips replied that it was cloudy and dark. During Winslow’s skirmish against the rebel rear guard, he could discover the lines of the enemy
by the light caused by the firing of their guns.

p. 242 - the 7th MM was ordered to the advance and to engage the enemy. Philips remember seeing McNiel but not Sanborn. They then halted east of Independence and when they were moved, they galloped forward.

asked if Pleasonton was excited, Philips said he spoke with a great deal of spirit, he is naturally a nervous man. He spoke with energy and force. Philips thought he was unusually escited that morning.

P. 243 - Brown replied to Pleasonton in a very low tone of voice and Philips was 20 steps away.

P. 244 - Philips believed that the 1st MSM could not have been engaged more than 10 or 15 minutes when the rest of the brigade came up. In the streets of Independence the 4th MSM waited for the artillery to move for quite some time and then they went arund it.

P. 245 - at the first position the enemy skirmished and gradually fell back. They did not make much of a stand there. They fell back through a field into a pasture, a total distance of half a mile. Here they seemed disposed seriously to oppose the union advance. The rebels had been using their guns for 20 minutes before the Union guns came up.

p. 246 - from the length of their line Philips judged that their force was superior to Brown’s. Asked why the rebs fell back, Philips said either because the feds out fought them or because they may not have intended to make a heavy stand there. He says: I know they stood their ground well and fought admirably, and were attempting a flank movement at one time. My impression is that they intended to retards our progress. They intended to whip us if they could and not to fall back. I think their resistance was to gain time, and they fought very hard to accomplish it. After giving up their strong position, they fell back until sunset when the firing ceased.

p. 247 - Col. Winslow engaged them about dark and they were skirmishing until 8 o’clock and 8 until 11 the firing was heavy and at times fierce. Asked where the rebels form3ed their first battleline on the Blue, Philips replied that it was on the east side of the river. "I don’t think it amounted to more than a skirmish line, but it was a heavy one. They were in force on the west side of the Blue." Asked if the rebels put up a fight at the Blue Philips replied "We had a heavy fight that day. I think the heaviest fight of the campaign."

P. 248 - Philips estimated that when they halted for the night of the 22nd, he had advanced 7 or 8 miles but it might have been more or less. Philips was able to tell that he got the order to move on the 23rd about day light because he had been using a fence rail for a pillow and was up and down several times fixing his bed. One annoyance was that soldiers kept lying on top of him. Finally he got up and sat by the fire, waiting for morning.

p. 249 - once Winslow and Brown started moving on the 23rd there wasw a space between the brigades. After traveling a quarter of a mile, Brown’s brigade struck the rear of Winslow’s brigade and began to pas it as fast as they could. AS Philips began to pass Winslow’s brigade he saw men leading horses and at one point on the left of the road there was a battalion of horses without writers. He assumed their riders were dismounted as skirmishers and occasionally he heard a volley of musketry in that direction. He supposed the strength of Winslow’s skirmishers at a regiment.

P. 250 - on the morning of the 23rd Philips heard Brown’s bugle sound to horse and then sound forward. The call was repeated in Philips’ regiment; he could not be sure about the other regiments. The bugle call occurred about the time Brown informed Philips of the movement he was to make, about daylight. When he went into action at Independence he had marched about 8 miles that day from the church on the Sni.

P. 251 - On the morning of the 23rd Philips came across the road to get a cup of coffee at Brown’s camp fire. Sanborn came to the fire while Philips was there. A short time later Brown came to Philips and informed him of the movement. Capt. Little might also have ordered him forward, but Philips acted on the information he received from Brown personally. On the morning of the 23rd the ammunition supply was greatly reduce in the action at Inddependence.

p. 252 - It was understood that our supply was so reduce and there was a necesity for replenishing and Philips sent back an order to hurry up his own wagons.

p. 253 - asked if he saw Genenerals Brow and Sanborn reading a paper by firelight, Philips said no.

p. 254 - Asked if he heard musketry after they moved, Philips replied yes. He had supposed they were only a mile from Big Blue and he was wondering why they hadn’t come to it. Asked if he heard it before they moved, he said no, but there might have been. Philips noticed that the 1st MSM was behind the 4th because, after Brown’s arrest and after he had put the dismounted regiment (7th) into action, he checked the condition of the other regiments and found the 1st closed up on the 4th.

p. 255 - He asked for the adjutant of that regiment to report to him as a staff officer. This took place about 20 or 25 minutes after he arrived where Col. Winslow was and 10 or 15 minutes after Pleasonton rode up to them.

Testimony of T.T. Crittenden, Major 7th MM Cav.

P. 256 - Crittenden estimated that it was about 2 p.m. when he arrived at Independence. After being halted in Independence for some cause, the 4th MSM moved forward and the 7th MSM followed. He passed through the town at a rapid rate. West of town and at its western limits he came upon the 1st MSM Cav. Brown ordered one battalion of the 7th to be dismounted and put into action. It was dismounted and Crittenden accompanied it. Brown ordred him to move to the left of the 1st MSM and the right of the 4th MSM thereby placing his battaion in the center of the brigade battle line. Crittendent went down the road where he met McFerran who told him to to to his right, not his left as Brown had directed. Crittenden informed McFerran that he had other orders to obey first. He was engaged in that fight about two hours or two and a half hours.

p. 257 - Crittenden estimated the enemy force at two brigades, based on what prisoners told him One of his informants was Lt. Col. Young who was wounded and was able to talk to Crittenden. It was approaching sundown when the fighting ended. As soon as it was mounted the command traveled west behind Winslow’s brigade.

p. 258 - asked how long they moved that evening, Crittenden said he didn’t know, that some people said they stopped at 11 or 12 and others said 1 or 2 o’clock. He slept very little that night. Asked what time he was up the next morning he said they were up before they moved and they moved between daylight and sunup. Crittenden traveled 2o r 3 miles before he overtook Winslow’s command. .He reached the front at 7 o’clock or after.

p. 259 - Crittenden was riding along at the head of the 7th MSM with Col. Philips when a written order from Gen. Brown arrived. Philips read it and wheeled the regiment to the left and into line and then ordered the men to dismount. They were there 10 or 15 minutes before they were ordered forward. They came to the head of Winslow’s brigade and halted again. Philips then gave the order to go into action. Just then Pleasonton came up. He relieved Brown of command and put Pleasonton in his place. Crittenden took command of the 7th. Only a few minutes elapsed between the time they dismounted and moved into action. Crittenden had the men move at the double quick.

P. 260 - Crittenden brought on the engagement with his regiment. Pleasonton’s order was "Cclear those people of the bottom and that instantly." Crittenden went down to where the 3rd Iowa Cavalry had some skirmishers thrown out. He threw out one battalion of the 7th covering the 3rd Iowa’s front. They were on the left of the road about 50 yards and there was a precipice of about 6 feet to descend. The commanding officer said to Crittenden, "If you take your men down there they will all be killed." Crittenden replied he had orders to do it and would try. Crittenden lost a lieutenant killed there but he cleared cleared them out of the bottom and across the creek though they were firing furiously on his battalion the whole time.

In the early part of the night of the 22nd/23rd it was very dark. But the moon rose after midnight.
P. 261 - Re Pleasonton’s and Brown’s conversation, Crittenden recounted that Pleasonton said, "You have not obeyed my orders this morning. You have acted most disgracefully You have some men here who would fight if you would give them an opportunity, but you have not given them an opportunity.." Brown undertook to make some explanation. Pleasonton didn’t let him finish.

P. 262 - asked what the object of the rebel stand west of Independence was, Crittenden replied "to resist our advance as much as posible and drive us back." On the 23rd Pleasonton cut Brown short when he offered an explanation.

p. 263 - Brown told Pleasonton that he had obeyed his order. Crittenden thought that the 7th MSM reached the head of Winslow’s column at 7 a.m. or after. Asked how many skirmishers Winslow had out, Crittenden said not as much as a battalion but more than a company.

p. 264 - It was 2 miles before they caught up with Winslow’s rear on the morning of the 23rd. The 7th came to a creek to water their horses and there was this battery that was between Winslow’s rear and their front. The 7th marched slowly because one of its battalions had fallen behind and they wanted it to catch up.

Testimony of Maj. George W. Kelly, 4th MSM

p. 265 -On the 22nd they marched from Wellington to Independence.

p. 266 - Kelly was halted at Independence by one of Pleasonton’s staff oficers. Here he waited at least 30 minutes. He was ordered to furnish a detail of at least 40 men under a commissioned officer to take charge of the captured rebel artillery, plus another company to act as provost guard in town.

p. 267 - He received that second order from the han of Col. Cole.

p. 268 - He received his oder to move from an orderly of Gen. Brown, to move on the double quick, that the 1st was heavily engaged, and "we moved on a gallop." Kelly estimated that the action lasted for an hour and a half or two hours after he arrived. "It was a right smart little fight." The fighting ceased when the sun was half an hour in the sky. About half an hour or more before the firing ceased, he notified Gen. Brown that he was out of ammunition. When the fight began all of Kelly’s squadrons had full cartriedge boxes except two and these lacked 4 or 5 rounds of being full.

P. 269 - his orders were to keep closed on the 7th MM which he did. And when Brown’s guble sounded "to horse" and "advance" his bugler repeated it. Brown sounded "to horse " just as day light was coming and about ten minutes after the bugler had sounded "advance" They moved forward about half an hour after the bugle sounded to advance.

P. 270 - some of the rear companies of the 7th rode off at a trot and he had to do the same. First he encountered stragglers and the pack train of Winslow’s brigade. He pushed them to the side of the road and went on. In about a mile he struck Winslow’s column who were halting and moving alternately. When he saw the 7th, part were on horses and part dismounted. This was after sun ruse.

p 271 - The distance he traveled from Brown’s camp to the head of Winslow’s column was 2 and a half or three miles. When he reached the front he saw Gen. Pleasonton, Bron and Col. Philips. He supplied himself with ammunition about the time the guble sounded. He passed Winslow’s stragglers all along the route. There were 8 or 10 in a house by the road.

P. 272 - He supposed the enemy resisted because they needed time to destroy Gens. Curtis and Blunt. He knew he fought a superior force at Indepdence.

p. 273 - Winslow took Brown’s place as the rebs reached their horses and started off. When he passed Pleasonton, Pleasonton ordered him to keep up with the skirmish line and when he got a chance "charge the enemy."

p. 274 - the skirmish line consisted of Winslow’s brigade and part of the 7th MSM. One battalion was mounted and back in the road. On the 23rd Kellyu moved a little after daylight. Kelly was pasing Winslow when Pleasonton pased him. Maj. Suess asked Kelly what he was doing and Kelly told him he was trying to get to the front." He estimated the length of Winslow’s column at half a mile. Winslow’s brigade was tolerably closed up. There was a big gap between the regiment ahead of Kelly and the next one.

Testimony of Lt. P.S. Keney, Lt. And Quarter Master of the 1st MSM Cav and acting quartermaster for the brigade.

P. 277 - on the 22nd Keney was halted about 5 miles east of Independence. He was with Gen. Brown at the time and some men came from the front and gave the order to Gen. Brwon to hal the ammunition train, and Brown gave Kenney the order At the time he was at the Little Blue. He was with Brown assisting in crossing the artillery and cavalry over the river. A general order came from the front ordering the ammunition train to cross the river. Brown ordered Kenney to bring the ammunition train across, and he went back 5 or 6 miles after it.

P. 278 - Keney says the ammunition train was 14 or 15 miles east of Independence. He then followed the command up to and through Independence. He traveled 3 miles or perhaps more west of Independence and caught up with the 1st MSM Cav. In the road. They were mounted nd going to the front. There was some fighting going on and he didn’t like to go any further. He looked for Brown and couldn’t find him. Then he turned the train of the road and camped for the night.

P. 279 - On Oct. 23rd as soon as he had light enough to see, Keney traveled to the front and met Gen. Brown. An orderly came to the train before daylight and told Keney that the 4th and 7th were out of ammunition. At that point Keney told them to take their own wagons with them to the front. Immediately after this Keney moved up the rest of the ammunition train.

the trains in motion to supply the 1st MSM. He arrived between daylight and sunup.

P. 280 - He met McFerran who told him, "Quartermaster my regiment is out of ammunition." Keney gave orders to the teamsers and they went to work distirbuting ammunition. They were many calibers of guns in that regiment - .54, .56 and .58. He noticed some men detached from the 1st MSM - 15 or 20 men boiling coffee under Capt. Perry and Lt. Johnson.

P. 281 - En route to the 1st MSM Keney saw 75 or 80 troopers getting something to eat on both the right and left sides of the road. They were not members of the 1st MSM. .

P. 282 - Keney says the sun was going down when he crossed the Little Blue with his ammunition train. It is 9 miles from Little Blue to Independence. Hr eached Independence He reached Indepdence about 8:30 and reached Brown’s brigade about 9 p.m. At Little Blue, Brown ordered Keney to bring up the

p. 283 - ammunition train and he did so. Asked why he didn’t report to Gen. Brwon, Keney answered that he inquired where Brown was and couldn’t find him. Since there was firing up front, he didn’t move the wagons forward. As soon as there was light on the 23rd he moved forward and found Brown standing by a campfire.

P. 284 - Brown’s camp was about 800 yards from where Keney saw McFerran

Testimony of Col. James McFerran, 1st MSM Cav.

p. 284 -.McFerran estimates that the 1st MSM was engaged alone west of Independence before reinforced for 3/4 of an hour to one hour. The nature of the engagement was heavy musketry firing. The enemy’s force was much superior to his and extended 3/4 of a mile in length. He extended his lines to prevent their flanking him. There was an effort to flank his left especially before reinforcements arrived and he thought on the right too as well..

P. 285 - At the beginning of the engagement the men of his regiment were well supplied with ammunition, considering the character of their cartridge boxes which were much worn.

p. 286 Because there was a great variety of arms in the regiment, some men had a greater supply than others. The average was 30-40 rounds. In the evening about the time the fight at Independence ceased, McFerran told Gen. Brown that the ammunition of his regiment was pretty well exhausted.

p. 287 - and it was before Winslow’s brigade moved forward. About the time the firing ceased, Gen. Brown told McFerran to have his dismounted horses brought up and mount his men and follow in the rear of his brigade. On the 23rd between daylight and sunup

288 - the ammunition wagons came up and McFerran ordered his command to procure a supply of ammunition. About that time Maj. Suess of Pleasonton’s staff ordered McFerran to procure ammunition before he moved. McFerran replied that the ammunition had arrived and he was having his men supplied at that time. There was a great variety of public and private arms. There was the Austrian rifle, the enfield rifle, burnside carbine of public use. And the men had a number of private arms, wesson’s rifle, sharp’s rifle, and colts rifle.

P. 289 - In addition there was a variety of pistols in the command

290 - McFerran says he was arrested at sunup and the command moved forward 10 or 15 minutes later.

291 - McFerran believes Cole might have given Lazear instructions after McFerran was relived but he paid no attention since he’d been arrested. The regiment halted at 10 or 11 p.m. because the regiment in front had halted. During the night he kept a watch on those troops, intending to follow them whenever they moved. McFerran said he was convinced that there were troops immediately in front of him who had not moved when he was arrested. He was at the head of his regiment all night until he was arrested.

P. 292 - These troops were 10 or 15 paces in advance of him.

Prior to the action of the 22nd while on the Sny at Wellington, at about 3 or 3 a.m. Brown sent for McFerran and gave him instructions about marching his command, about a rear guard etc.

p. 293 - asked if Brown had communicated the contents of Pleasonton’s Order No. 3 McFerran replied, "Well he communicated to me about having roll calls. That is in No. 3 - and the rear guard, and probably the whole that is contained in No. 3."

P. 294 - Asked to whose command the troops in front belonged on the morning of the 23rd, he replied that previously the troops in his front had been the 4th MSM and he had assumed they were still there on the morning of the 23rd. he was sure they were a body of troops and not stragglers.

P. 295 - after that it took his command about 15 or 20 minutes to get ready to move. He did not hear any bugles sound that morning.

Stricken from testimony was on page 12, Pleasonton’s statement about Brown: "I felt, the night before, that unless I isued the order, that unless I put it in the orders I did, he would not make any sort of an attack. He was continuously making excuses, rather than attempting to do his duty, from the first time he came under my command." "I considered the the thing disgraceful for men pretending to be military men to have a command in that condition. It was perfectly disgraceful."

And on page 29: "But the impression on my mind was that when he was ordered to do a thing I never felt any confidence that it was to be done at

p. 296 - the proper time."