Junior and Senior Reserves were armed and equipped by Confederate authorities. Arms from home, such as they may have been, would have meant that Ordnance officers had to provide ammunition for an untold variety of weapons. The Ordnance Dept had enough problems without having to accomodate civilian firearms.

Regarding Gen. Johnston declining to accept the Alabama cavalry command and sending back it back home --

OR Ser I, Vol 38, part 4:733

HDQRS. ARMIES OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES, Richmond, May 22, 1864. General SAMUEL COOPER, Adjutant and Inspector General:

GENERAL: Clanton's brigade of cavalry, ordered to General Johnston when Roddeys was ordered away, has not been taken up on the return. I suggest that an explanation be asked.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, JNO. B. SALE, Colonel and Military Secretary. (For General Bragg.)

[First indorsement.] BUREAU OF ADJT. AND INSP. GENERALS OFFICE, June 1, 1864.

Respectfully referred to General J. E. Johnston for information as to what has become of Clanton's brigade, ordered to the Army of Tennessee on 2d of April, 1864; and if in the Army of Tennessee why it has not been taken up on the returns.

By command of the Secretary of War: SAML. W. MELTON, Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General.

[5econd indorsement.] HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF TENNESSEE, In the Field, July 15, 1864.

Respectfully returned. General Clanton's brigade never reached this army. One regiment came and the general represented that the rest, then dispersed, was to assemble at Blue Mountain. He further represented that he could do good service in putting down plundering, arresting deserters, and perhaps getting in rear of the enemy. He was ordered to take his small regiment from the army and attempt it. No return of the army was made while that regiment was in it. General Clanton] has not since been heard from.

[J. B. JOHNSTON.

Regarding your question, "Could they not have helped with scouting and other duties that did not necessarily mean combat, to free up Wheeler's regular cavalry? Also during that period of time the federals were involved in raids in Alabama, were they used as advance guards to warn other units and even civilians of their approach?"

Answer - One would suppose they could do that and more. However, lack of training and (more importantly), lack of discipline made these units much less efficent than they should have been. Consider the following concerning Clanton's command, the 6th and 8th (Livingston's) Alabama Cavalry. Both regiments included companies recruited under authority of the Conscript Bureau in 1863-64.

OR Ser I, Vol 38, part 4:754

HDQRS DEPARTMENT OF ALA, MISS AND EAST LA, Selma, Ala, June 1, 1864. Brig Gen GIDEON J PILLOW, C S Army, Selma, Ala:

GENERAL: You as senior officer will have charge of the cavalry for the defense of the iron and coal works. It is my wish that your brigade and Clantons should be at Blue Mountain, and only such part of Chalmers force as may be necessary there, the most of Chalmers division remaining at Montevallo. I desire you to take Clanton in hand and have his men got together. I understand many of the officers have furloughed the men varying from thirty to sixty days. This must be corrected, officers arrested and brought to trial.

I am, general, yours respectfully, S D LEE, Major-General.

When Rosseau's raiders reached the Coosa River on their mission to break the raid line between Montgomery and Atlanta, Clanton's men defended the crossings at Ten Islands Ford and Greenport. Here is Rousseau's report of the result, Clanton never submitting his own report:

OR Ser I, Vol 38, part 2:906

The enemys force consisted of the Sixth and Eighth Alabama Cavalry, with militia, under command of Brigadier-General Clanton. Their loss, as nearly as could be ascertained, was 16 killed, 40 wounded, and 8 taken prisoners. General Clantons acting adjutant-general, Captain Abercrombie, and a Captain Moore were among the killed, and Lieutenant-Colonel Lary and Major McWhorter, of the Sixth Alabama, were captured. The only casualty in my command was the wounding of 1 man of the Eighth Indiana Cavalry.

A report of this action in the New York Times (Aug 3, 1864) mentions that the man injured "was wounded by a comrade, who mistook him for a rebel."

A number of recently raised Confedertate reserve and Alabama militia companies were nearby and should have served in the capacities you listed. The post commander at Talladega AL, Major Williamt Walthall, file a report following the disaster at Ten Islands:

OR Ser I, Vol 38, part 3:978

The apathy of citizens and the inefficiency of voluntary organizations of the reserves above the age of forty-five were strikingly manifest during these events. It was scarcely possible at any time to obtain a dozen mounted men to do duty as couriers or scouts, and on the morning of the enemys entrance into Talladega, as already mentioned, I could not obtain one.

As to the difference of leadership and discipline, Rousseau's men next encounted resistance at Chehaw Station, on the rail line east of Montgomery. Cadets from the University of Alabama and five companies of Junior Reserves came by rail and attacked Rousseau. Although terribly outnumbered and having only smoothbore muskets to fight Federal cavalry armed with Spencer rifles, Rousseau decided to withdraw, thinking they represented the advance of a larger force. The Times writes,

Finding that the rebels were in considerable force, and were prepared to make an obstinate defence, and that to drive them completely from the road would require a withdrawal of a portion of the forces engaged in destroying the track, Gen. ROUSSEAU ordered that portion of the command back, the track having in the meantime been destroyed several miles below Notasulga.

Meanwhile General Clanton had reassembled his force but never really bothered Rousseau's men again.