I was not aware of that. I figured that might be the case in some instances with the fixed artillery, but did not know that the field artillery included soldiers incapable of infantry duty.
I like to think that the Confederate armies everywhere could have been substantially more effective with a transfer to the infantry of excess mounted troops and a reworking of the artillery [and others].
Fixed artillery manned by very large heavy artillery regiments and battalions also seem to offer a potentially significant addition to the infantry. With a studied approach, the fixed artillery garrisons could have developed a ready reserve of infantry from their respective artillery garrisons. When no threat was present, at least the men could have been put to use as infantry, rather than watching the tide come in and go out, in the case of coastal garrisons.
In this way, for example, if Charleston is the point attacked, Wilmington and Savannah could supply heavy artillery to be used as infantry supports. This would reduce the need for front line infantry to be held in those fixed positions.
Of course, the superfluous mounted troops needed a major dismounting effort in all areas.
In both cases, the inability to support the horses would have seemed reason enough to force wholesale transfers to the infantry.
The inability, or lack of motivation, to maximize infantry has always been one of my major issues with the Adjutant General's office of the Confederacy. Seems to me that there were so many ineffective troops that could have made a much greater impact if in the infantry.
In the Trans Mississippi, the efforts of Hindman to transfer several cavalry regiments to infantry because of the inability to feed the horses, and the late war efforts of Kirby Smith to do the same are offset by the interim period of allowing the seemingly endless organization of one after another of mounted units.
In 1864, Joe Johnston proved that you could scour the army for men to increase the infantry. He replaced teamsters with negroes and promptly put the wagon drivers into the infantry.
Maybe D. H. Hill should have been Adjutant General rather than sitting at home without a job. I love his wording of a rejection of a transfer from the infantry to a band: "We need shooters, not tooters."